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Responding to Rawls: Toward a Consistent
and Supportable Theory of Distributive Justice
David Elkins*
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributive justice is concerned with the question of how benefits
and burdens, and in particular how economic resources, should be
allocated. Contemporary discussions of distributive justice are dominated
by Rawlsian methodology, which proceeds from the presumption that
talents and social position are undeserved and cannot support claims of
entitlement. While the distribution of such attributes is itself neither just
nor unjust, the justice inherent in a society is measured by the extent to
which it is willing to neutralize such morally arbitrary factors in
determining the distribution of economic resources. Nevertheless, as
material incentives are ordinarily required in order to encourage
productive economic activity, a balance must be struck between the
demands of equality and those of efficiency. The question is where to
strike that balance.1
John Rawls argued that positions that people take with regard to
questions of distributive justice may be influenced by their knowledge of
how they themselves would fare under various structures. He therefore
proposed investigating what principles would be adopted by individuals
unaware of their own talents or social status—what he referred to as the
“original position”—so that they would not be able accurately to predict
how any particular structure would affect them.2 Behind this “veil of
* Senior Lecturer and Distinguished Teaching Fellow, Netanya College School of Law, Israel.
Visiting Professor of Law, SMU Dedman School of Law. Ph.D. Bar Ilan University, 1999; LL.M.
Bar Ilan University, 1992; LL.B. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1982. This Article was supported
by a grant from the SMU Dedman School of Law. For their helpful comments, I would like to thank
Daniel Statman and my brother Jeremy Elkins. I would also like to thank my wife Sharron and my
mother Miriam for reviewing earlier drafts. Any errors that remain are, of course, my own
responsibility.
1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 67–72 (1971). The impact of Rawls’s work on
political theory in general, and distributive justice in particular, cannot be overstated. “A Theory of
Justice is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and moral philosophy
which has not seen its like since the writings of John Stuart Mill, if then. . . . Even those who remain
unconvinced after wrestling with Rawls’ systematic vision will learn much from closely studying it.”
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (1974).
2. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 18–19.
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ignorance,” Rawls claimed, risk aversion would overcome all other
considerations: one would not risk the little he might have in order to
increase what he would receive were he one of the wealthy.3 The result
would, therefore, be the adoption of principles maximizing the welfare
level of the least well-off (“the difference principle”).4
The difference principle is not, however, the only possible outcome
of Rawlsian methodology. In particular, the degree of risk aversion that
the participants would display might arguably range anywhere from the
extreme of zero, in which case participants would presumably adopt
welfare-maximizing principles conforming with classic utilitarianism, to
the overwhelming role that Rawls assumed it would play.5 The greater
the risk aversion, the less willing the participants would be to sacrifice
equality for greater total welfare.6
The evident truth of the proposition that individuals do not deserve,
in a moral sense, the attributes which determine their distributive shares
of social goods7 and the apparently inexorable reasoning from that point
forward seem to indicate that, while the difference principle itself might
be disputable, some type of Rawlsian redistribution is morally required.
In fact, the Rawlsian methodology is so powerful that, as Nozick himself
claimed, today’s political philosophers must “either work within Rawls’s

3. Id. at 152–53.
4. Id. at 75–78. Drawing on the terminology of game theory, Rawls described the difference
principle as the “maximin solution to the problem of social justice.” Id. at 152.
5. Benjamin R. Barber, Justifying Justice: Problems of Psychology, Politics and
Measurement in Rawls, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 292, 297–
98 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975); see also NICHOLAS RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A
CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE UTILITARIAN THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION 25–38 (1966) (discussing
relationship between maximizing total welfare and distribution of welfare). Interestingly, Rawls
assumed that one of the things that individuals in the original position would be unaware of would
be their aversion to risk. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 137. It might also be noted that individuals in the
real world are, in fact, willing to take risks. A person who chooses, for instance, a risky career path,
indicates by her behavior that the possibility of great reward should she be successful is sufficient to
offset the chance that she will end up with a lesser share of social goods than a safer career path
promises. Although she knows, as does an individual in the original position, that she has but one
life to live, she nevertheless is willing to risk being less well-off than otherwise if the chances of
being better-off are sufficiently attractive.
6. See Menahem E. Yaari, A Controversial Proposal Concerning Inequality Measurement,
44 J. ECON. THEORY 381, 382 (1988) (presenting “equality-mindedness” in the real world as
conceptually equivalent to risk aversion behind the veil of ignorance).
Throughout this Article, any principle of distributive justice that can be derived from
Rawlsian methodology will be referred to as “Rawlsian,” whether or not it conforms to the
difference principle. Any redistribution necessary to advance a Rawlsian conception of distributive
justice will be referred to as a “Rawlsian redistribution.”
7. This truth is so evident that even Robert Nozick, libertarianism’s prime spokesman and
Rawls’s ideological arch opponent, was forced to accept it. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225
(“[C]orrectly, we describe people as entitled to their natural assets even if it’s not the case that they
can be said to deserve them.”).
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theory or explain why not.”8 Therefore, in conformity with Nozick’s
dictate, I will first explain why I find Rawls’s theory unacceptable.
Rawlsian methodology, if applied consistently, appears to require a
redistribution of economic resources, not only among members of a
given society, but also internationally. Nationality, after all, is no less
arbitrary than other attributes, yet it plays a significant role in
determining an individual’s life chances. Therefore, Rawlsianism would
seem to imply cosmopolitanism, or the application of Rawlsian
principles of justice without regard to national boundaries. Nevertheless,
most social philosophers, including Rawls himself, reject
cosmopolitanism and hold that Rawlsian principles are only applicable
to, or can be limited to, the citizens or residents of a given society.9 It
should be noted that Rawls was willing to concede that wealthy societies
do have a minimal obligation toward societies whose level of material
wealth is insufficient to allow them to become “well ordered.”10 He
rejected, however, any notion of international redistribution that was
more comprehensive.11
A number of arguments have been raised by proponents of what I
shall refer to as “domestic Rawlsianism” to explain why Rawlsian
principles are inapplicable internationally.12 Nevertheless, if these
arguments fail, and if one is unwilling to embrace the concept of a global
Rawlsian redistribution, then one would be left with no alternative but to
reject Rawlsianism itself. In other words, the dismissal, on intuitive
grounds, of cosmopolitanism requires a similar dismissal of
Rawlsianism.
Nevertheless, rejecting Rawlsianism does not necessarily imply
retreating into libertarianism.13 Libertarians avoid the conflict between
8. Id. at 183.
9. MARGARET CANOVAN, NATIONHOOD AND POLITICAL THEORY 28–29 (1996); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 11–12 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 115–20 (1999)
[hereinafter RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES]; YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 121 (1993); MICHAEL
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31 (1983); Michael
Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, in COMMUNITARIANISM AND
INDIVIDUALISM 12, 22–24 (Shlomo Avineri & Avner De-Shalit eds., 1992).
10. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 106 (“Burdened societies . . . lack the political
and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological
resources needed to be well-ordered. The long-term goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should
be to bring burdened societies . . . into the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”). Assisting burdened
societies to become well-ordered involves emphasizing human rights and teaching them to manage
their own affairs. Id. at 106–12. In some cases, although not in all, wealth transfer may be necessary.
Id. at 108–09.
11. Id. at 119–20.
12. See infra Part II.
13. While accepting that attributes such as talents and social position are ultimately
undeserved, see e.g, NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225, libertarians nevertheless argue that individuals
are entitled to whatever they receive in market exchanges or as gifts. Redistribution is inappropriate,
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domestic justice and international justice by denying that justice
demands redistribution, even domestically. However, this approach does
not conform to what many would deem to be our considered
judgments.14 There is something not quite right with a world in which
some individuals literally have more than they know what to do with,
while others, no less deserving, lack basic sustenance. Libertarianism, I
believe, fails to take into account most people’s fundamental belief that
vast discrepancies in material wealth cannot be completely ignored,
especially when it is conceded that the rich do not have any desert-based
claim to their holdings.
For a theory of justice to be acceptable, it needs to be both internally
consistent and in conformance with our considered judgments.15 I believe
that domestic Rawlsianism fails on the first count and that
cosmopolitanism and libertarianism fail on the second. Thus, in addition
to being internally consistent, an acceptable theory would have to occupy
the ideological middle ground between cosmopolitanism and
libertarianism.16
If limiting the application of distributive justice to the domestic arena
proves impossible, the only other approach appears to be to argue for a
conception of justice that is more limited in intensity yet more extensive

they claim, because there never was a distribution in the first place. An individual’s holdings are
achieved though a myriad of exchanges and transfers over which no one person or institution has any
overriding control. FRIEDRICH AUGUST VON HAYEK, ‘Social’ or Distributive Justice, in THE
ESSENCE OF HAYEK 63, 68–70 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984); see also NOZICK,
supra note 1, at 149–50.
14. “Considered judgments” is a phrase coined by Rawls and defined by him as “those
judgments in which our moral capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion. . . . For
example, we can discard those judgments made with hesitation, or in which we have little
confidence[,] . . . those given when we are upset or frightened, or when we stand to gain one way or
the other . . . .” RAWLS, supra note 1, at 47. Nevertheless, the source of our considered judgments—
even those we retain after taking the proverbial deep breath and neutralizing whatever personal
interest we may have—presents a serious problem in discussions of distributive justice. Our most
powerful and unshakable basic attitudes are molded by historical and sociological forces of which
we are ordinarily unaware. See JEREMY RIFKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW 5–6 (1980).
Building philosophical castles on clouds of considered judgments may, therefore, merely serve to
perpetuate accepted prejudices.
15. Rawls implicitly assumes that the considered judgments of all reasonable people would
be similar. Without necessarily relying on such a premise, the arguments presented in this Article
will assume that certain basic conceptions of right and wrong are common to most people. It may be
conceded that those who do not will not find the arguments presented here compelling.
16. What Rawls refers to as “the liberal conception,” the position that environmentally
arbitrary factors should be neutralized and that distribution should accord to natural talents, occupies
the appropriate middle ground. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 73. Nevertheless, liberalism fares no better
than Rawlsianism in its attempt to avoid inconsistency. The first problem with liberalism, as pointed
out by Rawls, is that natural talents are no more arbitrary than environmental factors and are no more
deserved from a moral point of view. Id. at 75. The second problem is that national affiliation would
appear to be one of those environmentally arbitrary factors which need to be neutralized. Liberalism,
like Rawlsianism, would thus imply cosmopolitanism.
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geographically. One may posit that justice is satisfied by something less
than a Rawlsian redistribution, but that the demands of justice—limited
as they are—are universal. Nevertheless, while the demands of justice
are universal, a state, in regulating its internal affairs, might go beyond
the demands of distributive justice and effect a more extensive
redistribution, provided certain conditions are met. The theory of justice
proposed in this Article is such an approach: a model of distributive
justice that focuses on needs and their fulfillment and on redistribution
beyond the dictates of distributive justice.
Part II of the Article explores the relationship between Rawlsianism
and cosmopolitanism. It shows how Rawlsianism logically leads into
cosmopolitanism and examines the various arguments which have been
raised to avoid this result. The analysis will show that the arguments are
ultimately unsuccessful and that domestic Rawlsianism must be rejected
as internally inconsistent. This Part further argues that unless one is
willing to embrace cosmopolitanism, one must reject Rawls’s position
that human society is under a positive moral obligation to neutralize the
admitted unfairness inherent in nature.
As an alternative to Rawlsianism, Part III introduces a needs-based
model of distributive justice. Although admitting that the natural
distribution is unfair, this model does not view the inequality itself as
imposing any moral duty on those who have more to share the wealth
with those who have less. Rather it argues that where a person is in need
and another person or group of persons is capable of satisfying that need
at a non-prohibitive cost, there is a moral obligation to do so. This Part
also discusses some of the differences between inequality-based justice
and needs-based justice and attempts to show why the consequences of
needs-based justice conform better to our considered judgments.
Part IV considers the implications of needs-based justice for
domestic redistribution. Whatever duties are imposed by the terms of
distributive justice must be applicable globally: needs-based justice
requires that both the needs of compatriots and the needs of foreigners be
addressed. It would seem to follow that, having satisfied those needs—
or, more accurately, having gone as far in acting to satisfy needs as the
terms of justice require—distributive justice can impose no further
obligation to enact a more comprehensive domestic redistribution. If
distributive justice requires a more comprehensive redistribution, then it
is unclear why foreigners should not be entitled to benefit from it. If, on
the other hand, distributive justice does not demand more than needs
satisfaction, it is unclear how a more extensive domestic redistribution
can be justified. Part IV addresses this issue and—in what is a mirror
image of the analysis of Part II—examines possible arguments for a
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more extensive domestic redistribution. The conclusion reached in Part
IV is that distributive justice is incapable of imposing different
obligations in the domestic and international arenas. This Part next
examines whether it is possible to justify a more comprehensive
domestic redistribution on a form of transactional justice embodied in
benefit theory. Classic attempts to do so, which rely on the supposed
greater benefit derived by the wealthy from government, are
unconvincing. Part IV, however, argues that concern for the fate of
compatriots, while insufficient either to limit or to expand the obligations
of distributive justice, can justify the imposition of taxation for the
purpose of improving the welfare of the less well-off beyond merely
satisfying their needs. Finally, this Part considers some implications of
the proposed model.
II. RAWLS AND COSMOPOLITANISM
If morally arbitrary factors are truly improper criteria on which to
stake distributive claims, justice would appear to require an international
Rawlsian redistribution. Ostensibly, an individual’s nationality would
appear to be as arbitrary an attribute as that individual’s race, gender,
social position, or natural talents. Each of these attributes is part of the
“natural lottery,” the results of which should, according to Rawls, be
neutralized as far as possible when determining distributive shares.17
There would, therefore, be no reason to halt the redistributive process at
national borders. Redistributing wealth among those who happen to be
citizens or residents of a certain country and ignoring the claims of those
located beyond its borders, merely on the basis of their inherited status as
outsiders, would appear to be as morally arbitrary as redistributing
wealth only among those of a certain racial or ethnic background, or only
among members of a given social class and ignoring the claim of those
not so classified.18
Reasonable individuals behind the veil of ignorance who were
unaware of their national affiliation would not agree to allow their life
chances to be determined by such affiliation any more than they would
allow them to be determined by their natural talents. It is therefore
surprising to discover that many social philosophers who adopt a
Rawlsian conception of justice hold that the requirement to redistribute
wealth is fully applicable only within the borders of a state and that the
17. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 74.
18. See Loren Lomasky, Toward a Liberal Theory of Natural Boundaries, in BOUNDARIES
AND JUSTICE: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 55, 56–60 (David Miller & Sohail H. Hashmi eds.,
2001).
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claims of outsiders to participate in the redistribution may be justifiably
ignored or, at the least, that a lesser level of redistribution is required to
satisfy their claims.19 This, in fact, was the position taken by Rawls
himself. The only obligations of international distributive justice that
Rawls recognized were those of richer states, vis-à-vis poorer states, to
guarantee that the latter are able to reach the level of material prosperity
necessary to sustain a well-ordered society.20 Beyond that minimum
level, Rawls argued that there is no moral obligation to redistribute
wealth, even if an alternative distribution of the world’s economic
resources would be more advantageous to the world’s worst-off persons
or group of persons.21
The question which needs to be addressed is whether domestic
Rawlsianism is a viable position or whether it suffers from a fatal
internal inconsistency, deriving from the fact that the fundamental
principle underlying Rawlsianism—that morally arbitrary attributes
cannot ground entitlement—seems to lead inexorably toward
cosmopolitanism. Saving domestic Rawlsianism from inconsistency,
however, cannot be achieved by adjusting or “fine tuning” the
fundamental Rawlsian principle so as to avoid cosmopolitanism unless
the rephrased principle itself conforms to our considered judgments. For
example, one may rephrase Rawls’s fundamental principle in the
following manner: the effects of morally arbitrary factors that impact an
individual’s welfare should be neutralized as far as possible, with the
single exception of national affiliation, which, although just as arbitrary
from a moral point of view, may legitimately determine what an
individual is able to achieve in his or her life. This rephrased principle
avoids cosmopolitanism, but at the cost of creating a conflict with our
considered judgments. Why should humanity not attempt to neutralize,
as far as possible, the effects of a person’s national affiliation, when
national affiliation is just as arbitrary, from a moral point of view, as are
other factors whose effects Rawls argues should be neutralized?
19. See infra Part II.A–D. Some political philosophers who advocate extensive redistribution
simply ignore, explicitly or implicitly, the possible international ramifications of the positions they
espouse. See JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY: TOWARD AN EGALITARIAN THEORY OF
OWNERSHIP 170–74 (1994) (discussing what a just state must provide its citizens with no mention of
the international arena); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 41 (2002) (arguing that the framework for discussion of tax policy is the state and explicitly
ignoring questions of global justice and international taxation); ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 19
(1991) (discussing different notions of how a just state treats its citizens while ignoring international
ramifications); see also JEREMY WALDRON, John Rawls and the Social Minimum, in LIBERAL
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 250–51 (1993) (discussing people’s entitlement to an
equal share of social wealth or to a minimum provision without considering the position of those
people who are not members of the society).
20. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 106.
21. Id. at 119–20.
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Is it possible to restrict the application of principles of distributive
justice to the internal affairs of a state and to ignore claims of foreigners
who would like to participate in the redistribution? Non-cosmopolitan
commentators who wrestle with the problem of the internationalization
of justice have raised a number of arguments in their attempts to justify
domestic Rawlsianism. The major justification attempts may be referred
to as the benefit apportionment argument, the national association
argument, the original position argument, and the functionality and
practicality argument.
A. Benefit Apportionment Argument
Rawls introduced his analysis of justice as fairness by pointing out
that human society is both cooperative and competitive. Through
cooperation, people can collectively achieve a higher level of welfare
than through individual effort. Nevertheless, he stated, although social
cooperation is marked by an identity of interests, the interests of
individuals conflict when it comes to distributing the benefits of that
cooperation. As the benefit of social cooperation is finite, each
individual’s interest in taking for himself as much of that benefit as
possible is incompatible with the interests of others. Justice, Rawls
claimed, involves the fair distribution of this benefit, and his theory of
justice as fairness was his attempt to describe how society should go
about distributing the benefits of social cooperation.22
From Rawls’s perspective, social cooperation appears to be both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for social justice. Where social
cooperation is lacking, the concept of justice is meaningless. Justice has
meaning only within the framework of a cooperative society.23
However, this line of reasoning would imply that in a state of nature,
individuals would be entitled to whatever level of welfare they were able
to achieve and that no one would have any legitimate claims to the
wealth produced by others. Thus Rawls, according to the benefit
apportionment argument, accepts the Lockean perspective that, in such a
state, each individual has exclusive rights in his or her own labor and in
the product of that labor.24 This in turn implies that each individual has
22. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 4.
23. “I concede that a criterion of justice for domestic institutions would be sufficient if
modern states were indeed closed schemes. In this case there simply would not be a global basic
structure for principles of global justice to apply to.” THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240
(1989); see also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 136–69
(1979).
24. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §27, at 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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the exclusive right to benefit from his or her own talents. On the other
hand, the difference principle is premised on the assumption that
individuals are not morally entitled to benefit from the talents they
happen to possess by virtue of the “natural lottery.”25 Thus the contention
that justice is applicable in a state of nature would appear to undermine
the entire logical structure upon which the difference principle is based.
Furthermore, natural talents by themselves are insufficient to
produce the necessities of life. A person, no matter how talented, cannot
produce food, clothing, or shelter without integrating a physical
component. Locke, therefore, argued that when a person combines his
labor with a part of the physical world, the rights of exclusive ownership
that the person had in his or her labor flows into the physical component,
and the person acquires exclusive rights to the product. According to
Locke, the labor necessary to ground a claim of ownership in a part of
the physical world can range from gathering nuts in the forest to
cultivating a plot of land.26
This rationale for exclusive ownership does not flow directly from
the first contention regarding the rights of each individual to his
endowment. One might accept the latter and yet argue that because the
product contains elements of both privately owned labor and the
commonly owned physical world, rights in the product should be
apportioned accordingly. The rest of humanity would therefore have a
claim to a proportionate part of the product.27
Nevertheless, the benefit apportionment argument appears to indicate
that Rawls accepts even this more controversial contention, based on the
benefit apportionment argument: as combining one’s labor with the
physical world is not an act of social cooperation, no one can
legitimately raise any claim based on justice to share in the wealth
created. In fact, Rawls’s position may be even more deferential to the
natural right of ownership than was Locke’s. While allowing a person to
combine his labor with that of the natural world and claim exclusive
ownership in the product, Locke was careful to add the proviso that the
laborer leave for others “as much and as good” as he took for himself.28
Where resources are limited and the appropriation by one would
negatively impact the ability of others to act similarly, the Lockean
proviso would act to deny the laborer’s claim to exclusive rights in the
product. Locke, therefore, limited the right to expropriate scarce natural
resources for private use.
25.
26.
27.
28.

RAWLS, supra note 1, at 73–74.
LOCKE, supra note 24, §28, at 288, §32, at 290–91.
NOZICK, supra note 1, at 174–75.
LOCKE, supra note 24, §27, at 288.
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On the other hand, Rawls is considerably less restrictive with regard
to the expropriation for exclusive use of part of the natural world. When
considering the international arena, Rawls avers that each state has
exclusive rights to the natural resources in its territory and is not required
to share with other nations the wealth derived from its exploitation of
those natural resources.29 Rawls does not require that a state must leave
for other states “as much and as good” as it took for itself. A state,
according to Rawls, may legitimately claim exclusive rights to extremely
scarce, and consequently valuable, resources.30
Introducing social cooperation changes Rawls’s position
dramatically. From advocating a position that is perhaps even more
deferential to the possibility of acquiring private property than that of
Locke, Rawls argues that wealth should be drastically redistributed in
accordance with the difference principle where there is social
cooperation involved. The following hypothetical examines whether
these two positions are, in fact, compatible.
Consider the case of two shipwrecked sailors, Mary and Paul, on a
deserted island. For whatever reason, they go their separate ways, and
each one fends for himself or herself. Assume that Mary turns out to be
an excellent hunter-gatherer. She enjoys lavish meals and comfortable
clothing; she is even able to stash away extra food and other resources
for the proverbial rainy day. Paul, on the other hand, is a mediocre
hunter-gatherer. He is unable to acquire much more than what he needs
for bare subsistence and is therefore unable to accumulate anything for
the future. According to Rawls, Mary is under no moral obligation to
share her wealth with Paul. Each is operating completely independent of
the other, and in the absence of social cooperation, there are no operative
rules of distributive justice.31
29. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 116–17.
30. Note also that, according to Rawls, the mere presence of natural resources in the state’s
territory is sufficient to ground claims of ownership to those resources, even before the state exerts
any effort to add value to those resources by combining them with its labor. Thus, while Locke held
that ownership results from the combination of labor with part of the natural world, Rawls’s position
apparently was that a state may claim rights to resources in its territory, without having added an iota
of economic value. Id. at 117 (“[T]he arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no
difficulty.”)
The acquisition of territory by a state is analogous to the acquisition of territory or other
natural resources by an individual or group of individuals in a state of nature. A state may be viewed
in this context as a group of individuals operating in a state of nature vis-à-vis other states and
acquiring territory either through first possession or by conquest. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
244 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651) (“[T]he law of nations, and the law of nature, is the same
thing.”). Interestingly, Rawls, when discussing the rights of a state to natural resources in its
territory, does not consider how it came to possess the territory in question.
31. Rawls, it might be added, would apparently release Mary from any moral obligation to
share her good fortune with Paul even if it turned out that Mary’s success resulted simply from her
half of the island being easier to hunt and gather in. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9,
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Mary and Paul now consider the possibility of joining forces. A day
or two of experimentation convinces them that together they can hunt
and gather more effectively than they can separately; their joint take is
greater than their separate takes combined. It would, therefore, be
rational for them to continue their cooperation. As Rawls points out,
however, while the two of them have a mutual interest in cooperating,
their interests diverge when it comes to distributing the benefits of that
cooperation.32 Being rational, they will most likely bargain for the
surplus wealth attributable to the cooperation. As the cooperation of each
is a necessary condition for obtaining the surplus wealth, and each is
equally capable of refusing to cooperate, they might end up splitting the
surplus evenly between them, so that each would be entitled to what he
or she would have acquired by working on his or her own plus half of the
remainder. Alternatively, Paul may recognize Mary’s superior skills and
agree that the surplus be divided proportionally; if, for example, Mary’s
average take in the absence of cooperation was three times that of Paul’s,
then Mary might get three-quarters of the cooperative take.
Of course, the situation might be different if Mary and Paul were to
marry, and especially if they were to raise a family together. In those
circumstances, it would no longer be necessary to negotiate the price of
social cooperation if, due to mutual affection and shared interest in the
fate of their children, each of them has as his or her goal the welfare of
the family unit. The couple might very well adopt Rawlsian principles in
distributing their resources. Not only would the benefit of cooperation be
shared, but so would each person’s original endowment.
However, where Mary and Paul are independent actors negotiating
for economic cooperation, it would not be reasonable to demand that
Mary allow Paul to keep the entire surplus to compensate him for his
relatively poor hunting and gathering skills. Doing so might be
commendable on Mary’s part, but it is unclear why justice would
demand such action. In the same way, Mary might be commended for
coming to Paul’s aid before the commencement of cooperation between
them, and yet Rawls would have imposed upon her no moral duty to do
so.
Nevertheless, once Paul and Mary begin cooperating in the
production of wealth, Rawls goes even further than vesting in Paul the
right to the entire surplus wealth. As the worst off individual in the
society, Paul would apparently have a claim to half of the entire take and,
moreover, to half of the wealth stashed away in Mary’s cave.33 In such a
at 116–17.
32. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 4.
33. Rawls would only allow Mary a greater share of the take if doing so were necessary in
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situation the various arguments raised by Rawls to justify the difference
principle would come into play. Mary does not deserve her exceptional
skill in any morally meaningful way. She does not have any claim of
moral desert to the wealth attributable to her natural talent. In Rawls’s
original position, Mary and Paul would not have agreed to allow the
wealth to accrue to the one who happened to be in possession of the
necessary skills.
But is the quantum leap from the justice-free realm of individual
action to the difference principle-dominated realm of social cooperation
justified? Mary’s entitlement, in a state of nature, to whatever material
level of well-being her natural talents allow her to achieve implies
exclusive rights in the natural talents she happens to possess. These
rights would, presumably, include the right to sell or trade the use of
those talents and to retain for her exclusive use whatever she received in
exchange.
From the perspective of justice as fairness, as subsequently
developed by Rawls, the problem with denying the applicability of
justice in a state of nature is that even in the absence of social
cooperation, the welfare level that an individual is able to achieve is the
result of factors that, in Rawlsian terminology, are arbitrary from a moral
point of view.34 As Rawls so strongly argues, the unequal distribution of
talents is a fact. It is neither just nor unjust. What is just or unjust is the
extent to which it is allowed to influence the distribution of primary
social goods.35 If it is assumed that a person deserves his natural talents,
then the possession of those talents might ground an entitlement claim to
the wealth which those talents produced. However, if, as Rawls claims, a
person does not deserve her natural talents, it would not appear that she
has any moral claim to the material wealth that those talents are able to
produce, whether she exploited those talents within the framework of
social cooperation or in a state of nature.36 In other words, if a person has
exclusive rights to her talents and to the wealth which they produce, she
should be entitled to whatever she receives in exchange for exploiting
them. If, on the other hand, she does not have exclusive rights to her

order to induce her to continue hunting and gathering for Paul’s benefit.
34. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 72.
35. Id. at 102.
36. Of course, a state of nature would, by definition, lack any mechanism by which to
enforce redistributive claims. This, however, does not detract from the legitimacy of those claims.
Indeed one of the main problems with a state of nature is the lack of enforceability of any natural
right. Thus, natural right theory maintains, individuals establish governments in order to enforce
their natural rights of life, liberty and property. If, as posited, their property rights include a portion
of the wealth produced through the talents of others, governments would be charged with enforcing
those rights too.

267]

A THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

279

natural talents, then it is unclear why she should have exclusive rights to
what they enable her to produce in the absence of social cooperation.
The same principles that were in play with regard to Mary and Paul
apply in a more sophisticated market setting as well. Individuals
negotiate for cooperation in their joint ventures. Those who own factors
of production—such as laborers, lenders, property owners, and
entrepreneurs—distribute among themselves the benefit of their
cooperation in accordance with the value of their contributions. The
ability of each owner of a factor of production to withhold her
contribution should ensure that each owner receives a share
commensurate with the marginal value of that contribution. The
principles of transactional justice, assuming they are applied in practice,
will ensure that no one is deprived of her fair share of the cooperative
product through fraud, deceit, coercion, or the like. Again, if each
individual has the exclusive rights to her own endowment—as the
inapplicability of distributive justice in the absence of social cooperation
would seem to indicate—then each individual has, by implication, the
exclusive rights to the value of her contribution to the joint enterprise.
Whatever she receives in exchange for that contribution is hers by right.
In contrast, the case for a Rawlsian distribution is premised on the
argument that an individual has no intrinsic right to the wealth she
produces. The absence of any prior claim of an individual to the wealth
she produces enables society to redistribute that wealth in accordance
with the difference principle. To posit otherwise would result in
redistribution being tantamount to theft, as is argued, in fact, by
libertarians.
Thus, the attempt to base domestic Rawlsianism on the benefit
apportionment argument is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. If one
posits that redistribution is inapplicable in a state of nature and that
individuals in such a state are entitled to benefit from morally arbitrary
factors, it follows that they would also be entitled to retain whatever they
received in exchange for agreeing to cooperate in the joint production of
wealth. Redistribution would be unjustifiable. On the other hand, if one
posits that justice requires the neutralization of the effects of morally
arbitrary factors even in the absence of social interaction, then, regardless
of the existence or extent of international cooperation, the redistribution
would need to be global in scope.
Arguing both for a natural right to the product of one’s labor—or,
more broadly, of the return from the use of any of one’s means of
production—and for a redistribution is not necessarily contradictory. In
fact, my own position, as will be developed further on, incorporates both
of these elements. The position presented here is merely that such a
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natural right is inconsistent with a Rawlsian redistribution.
B. National Association Argument
Another attempt to restrict the application of Rawlsian redistribution
is the argument that national association is what creates the rights and
obligations associated with distributive justice. Without the ties implied
by such association, goes the argument, the rules of distributive justice
are inapplicable. However, this claim raises an important question: why
is distributive justice inapplicable in the absence of national association,
or, contrapositively, why is national association a necessary condition for
distributive justice?
1. Sympathy
One attempt to support the national association argument is based on
the claim that people naturally feel close to those with whom they share a
common bond and a common destiny. Co-nationalists meet these criteria
and evoke, therefore, a certain degree of altruistic concern. Thus people
are usually willing to share their wealth with their compatriots beyond
the extent to which they are willing to share with others with whom they
do not share these common bonds.37
I see no reason to dispute the factual basis of this claim, which is
evidenced, for example, by the press coverage of a natural disaster or an
act of war or terrorism. The news services of a given country usually
devote disproportionate attention to the fate of victims who happen to be
nationals of that country. Presumably, the extent of this coverage results
from the fact that the public is, or is assumed to be, particularly
interested in the welfare of its compatriots. One may assume that people

37. DANIEL BELL, COMMUNITARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS 150 n.33 (1993) (“That our sense
of solidarity is strongest where ‘us’ means something smaller and more local than the human race
provides a strong argument against the feasibility of a world-wide system of distributive
justice . . . .”); CANOVAN, supra note 9, at 28–29 (observing that social justice theorists implicitly
take for granted that demands for distributive justice are applicable within a community of members
committed to sharing social goods); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 207 (1986) (noting that
political obligations are dependent upon fraternity among members of the political community);
WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM AND
CITIZENSHIP 225 (2001) (observing that people are willing to sacrifice for others only when there is
a “sense of common identity and common membership uniting donor and recipient, such that
sacrifices being made for anonymous others are still, in some sense, sacrifices for ‘one of us’”);
AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY 74–76 (2002) (arguing that a nation can be an ethical
community, but it is unreasonable to expect that all of humanity can be one, as caring requires
contrast); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 190–91 (1989) (noting that
moral obligations are toward those with whom we feel a sense of solidarity); TAMIR, supra note 9, at
121 (“The ‘others’ whose welfare we ought to consider are those we care about . . . .”).
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will be more receptive to sharing their wealth with their fellow nationals
than with others with whom they do not feel this common bond.38
Nevertheless, feelings of closeness cannot ground claims of
distributive justice. More pointedly, lack of these feelings cannot ground
a denial of claims to distributive justice. A person’s willingness to share
his or her wealth with another individual or group of individuals, while
perhaps laudable, is altruistic, and altruism is a concept considerably
different from distributive justice. Justice is the set of principles which
delineate those things to which an individual has a moral claim. Altruism
is a selfless act by an individual after all claims of justice have been
satisfied; it involves the voluntary waiver of just claims, or the voluntary
and unreciprocated transfer, for the benefit of others, of justly held
economic resources.39
Justice is not altruism. One who gives another his due is no more
altruistic than a trustee who transfers trust property to the beneficiary. If
for whatever reason legitimate claims of justice are not legally
enforceable, then voluntarily satisfying those claims is laudable; it is not,
however, altruistic. Returning lost property to its rightful owner, when
that person does not know what happened to his property and is thus
unable to take action to enforce his rights, is laudable. However, it is
laudable precisely because it involves satisfying a claim of justice which
would otherwise go unsatisfied. No altruism is involved aside from the
effort exerted in returning the item, assuming the actor was not
compensated for this effort. In order for the act to be considered truly
altruistic, the actor must have a legitimate option to use the item in his
possession for his own benefit. An altruistic act is an act beyond the call
of moral duty. Sharing one’s wealth with those of one’s choosing is
legitimate with regard to altruism, but it is not true with regard to justice.
Claims of justice must be satisfied without regard to one’s feelings
toward those to whom one owes moral duties. Not liking someone is not
a legitimate reason to steal from him; it is a legitimate reason not to give
him a gift.
Sympathy with the fate of one’s compatriots, like sympathy with the
fate of the members of one’s family, clan, or ethnic group, cannot,
therefore, affect the just claims of outsiders. “I cannot give to you that to
which you are entitled because I prefer to give it to someone close to me”
is not justice; it is embezzlement. The idea that national feelings can
somehow limit justice and confine it to the boundaries of a state must,
38. In fact, the apparent greater willingness to share with compatriots will be an important
element in the position I will develop later on.
39. Where the recipient is less well-off than the donor, and the donor’s motivation in making
the gift is to mitigate inequality, the act might be described as heroic. See infra Part IV.F.
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therefore, be rejected.
2. Possession of talents
A second attempt to ground the national association argument is the
claim that the talents of a society and the wealth derived from those
talents belong to members of that society and are, therefore, theirs to
dispose of and to distribute as they see fit.40 This claim is, in some ways,
similar to the benefit apportionment argument considered above. They
both proceed from the assumption that those who are not part of the
economic institutions concerned have no right to share in the
distribution. On the other hand, the emphasis of each argument is
different. The benefit apportionment argument proceeds from Rawls’s
claim that justice concerns the fair distribution of the benefits of social
cooperation. The claim presently being considered is that the country
possessing the talents has the intrinsic right to distribute the product of
these talents as it sees fit.
However, talents are most immediately possessed by individuals.
Indeed, when individuals with talents belong to a society, the talents may
be said, as a factual matter, to be possessed by that society. However, in
the same way, when those individuals are part of the human race, it may
be said that the talents are possessed by humanity. If the possessor of
talents is entitled to distribute the economic advantage derivable
therefrom, then identifying the possessor of the talents would appear to
entail far-reaching consequences. Asserting that the individual possesses
the talents and the right to benefit from them undermines Rawlsian
redistribution and leads toward libertarianism. Identifying humanity as
the possessor leads to cosmopolitanism. Thus, it appears arbitrary to
claim that the country possesses the talents and is free to distribute the
benefits as it sees fit.41
However the problem with this particular claim, which proceeds
from the assumption that a talent-possession society has the right to
exclude outsiders from benefiting from them, goes deeper. The
proposition is Nozickian in nature and appears to undermine not only

40. DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 84–85 (1995) (arguing that social justice occurs
mainly within national communities and that each community is entitled to the resources created by
its own members); Sandel, supra note 9, at 20–24 (describing, and rejecting, Rawls’s argument that
talents are the property of the community).
41. Imagine, for example, that particular talents are located in an individual who is part of an
ethnic community in a given country. Are the talents possessed by (a) the individual, (b) the ethnic
community, (c) the country, or (d) humanity? Choice (c), the only answer which would justify
domestic Rawlsianism, is not incorrect; it is simply not more correct than any other answer. Reliance
on that answer to justify domestic Rawlsianism is hardly compelling.
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cosmopolitanism, but domestic Rawlsian distribution as well. If mere
possession creates entitlement, as Nozick argued,42 then, just as the
country has an entitlement vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the individual
would have an entitlement vis-à-vis the rest of society. In other words,
were a given society to say to other societies that it has the right to
exclude them from benefiting from the talents it possesses, then, when
the society in question came to distribute internally the resources at its
disposal, it would be open to a compelling claim by the individual in
whom those talents resided that he has the right to exclude his
compatriots from benefiting from his talents. Of course, countering this
argument by pointing out that the particular individual possesses those
talents by mere happenstance and that as a consequence he has no moral
claim to the wealth which those talents generate exposes the society in
question to a similar claim by foreigners. The result, again, is that
rejecting cosmopolitanism leads to libertarianism and rejecting
libertarianism leads to cosmopolitanism. The present argument thus fails
to provide a coherent doctrine capable of rejecting both libertarianism
and cosmopolitanism in favor of the middle position of domestic
Rawlsianism.
3. Associative obligations
Some commentators have argued that the very act or circumstance of
association creates among its members rights and corresponding
obligations, the nature of which depend upon the type of organization.
These mutually held rights and obligations are not necessarily dependant
upon an individual voluntarily joining the association or consenting to
the others joining. The mere circumstance of membership in the
association is enough to create a bond of rights and obligations which
does not exist vis-à-vis non-members.43
When the association concerned is a state, the rights and obligations
concerned include those of distributive justice. Wealthy members of the
society have an obligation of concern towards less well-off members
and, consequently, are required to share their wealth with them. The
wealthy of country A, however, lacking any associative relationship with
the poor of country B, have no duty of concern for them.44
The problem with this argument, however, is that it assumes the very
proposition which it purports to prove. The question of why involuntary
42. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 225–26.
43. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 197–98; MILLER, supra note 40, at 83; WALZER, supra note
9, at 31.
44. TAMIR, supra note 9, at 100–01.
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association creates rights and obligations—and in particular why national
association creates the rights and obligations inherent to distributive
justice—is left unexplained.
Voluntary association in an institution often involves the assumption
of certain obligations. These obligations may be explicit or implicit, legal
or moral, long-term or temporary. A group of individuals who meet once
a week to play basketball may take upon themselves, through their
behavior, the obligation to play at a certain level of seriousness, and to
inform each other of a change in time or venue. Membership in a trade
union implies cooperation for the sake of achieving the best working
conditions for all. The obligations of friendship are more complicated
and depend to a great extent on the degree of friendship and the terms
implicitly agreed upon through the behavior of the parties. In all these
cases, however, the obligations are consensual. A person is not obligated
to more than the terms of association warrant. The mere fact of
association, even voluntary association, does not imply rights and duties
of distributive justice.
Certain associations, it is true, are founded upon terms which
simulate distributive justice. For example, membership in a classic
kibbutz requires the individual to accept principles of economic and
social cooperation based upon the Marxist concept of “[f]rom each
according to his ability, and to each according to his needs.”45
Nevertheless, the source of these obligations is not the moral duties of
abstract distributive justice, but rather the contractual relationship among
the members.
National association—in contrast to the relationships defined by
friendship or by membership in a trade union or a kibbutz—is by and
large involuntary.46 For most individuals, nationality is determined by the
place of their birth or by the nationality of their parents. Because of the
dearth of choice with respect to nationality, imposing the obligations of
45. Karl Marx, Marginal Notes to the Programme of the German Workers’ Party, in
CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME 17 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking. 1st ed. 1972) (1875);
see NAAMA SABAR, KIBBUTZNIKS IN THE DIASPORA 7 (2000) (noting the relationship of the
traditional purposes of the kibbutz and Marx’s communist ideal, in that “[t]he kibbutz was
traditionally based on the premise that the individual contributes to the collective according to
his/her ability and in return the kibbutz provides for all his/her needs”).
46. Where national association is voluntary, one might view the obligations implicit in such
association as contractual. For example, a person who voluntarily immigrates to, and is naturalized
in, a socialist country might be considered as having taken upon herself the terms of association of
that country. Her subsequent complaints regarding the high level of taxes imposed to finance public
services and transfer payments could be more easily ignored than similar complaints by one born in
the country. In the same way, a person who voluntarily immigrated to a traditional, strongly
patriarchal society would have considerably less standing to object to the structure of that society
than would a native-born individual. In both instances, the immigrant chose to live under those
terms. The inherent justice in the structure is therefore less relevant as far as she is concerned.
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distributive justice because of nationality cannot be seen as resulting
from any obligation undertaken by an individual when joining the
association. The question of why the happenstance of national
association creates such obligations remains unanswered.
Supporters of the national association argument may, nevertheless,
claim that a person does not choose his family and yet the obligations a
person has towards other members of his family are perhaps the most
intense of any obligatory duty. Analogizing from the family to the
country, a person may have obligations merely by being a member of a
country whether or not he chose that status.47 This argument merits
serious attention. Nevertheless, it must fail. The fact that family
attachment imposes certain obligations does nothing to further the
national association argument.
The first problem with extrapolating from obligations toward one’s
family to obligations toward one’s compatriots is that the moral source of
obligations toward one’s relatives is itself not clear. With regard to one’s
spouse and one’s children—those individuals toward whom one is
normally assumed to have the most intense obligations—the question can
be sidestepped by noting that in almost all cases, marriage and
parenthood are the result of voluntary acts. By marriage or by
procreation a person explicitly or implicitly accepts the obligations
inherent in the consequent relationship.
The obligations of children toward their parents are much more
limited and might be grounded in terms of reciprocity. That is, children
may have duties toward their parents in view of the support which they
themselves received, even though their parents, by the very act of
begetting children, unconditionally accepted upon themselves the
obligation to support their progeny.48 With regard to other relatives,
however, both the scope and the grounding of one’s obligation are far
from clear. What is the nature and extent of one’s obligations toward
one’s sibling, uncle, aunt, niece, nephew, cousin, or more distant
relation, merely by dint of the family connection?49 Why is one so
obliged? These questions warrant analysis beyond the scope of the
present work. However—and this is the essential point—analogizing
from a type of obligation whose scope and grounding are themselves so
47. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 201; WALZER, supra note 9, at 41 (“[S]tates are like
families . . . for it is a feature of families that their members are morally connected to people they
have not chosen . . . .”).
48. For this reason most people, for example, would probably feel that a child abandoned by
his parents has little or no obligation toward them.
49. Relatives may, of course, also be friends, and in those cases the obligations of friendship
and of family—neither of which is in any case explicitly delineated—would commingle. The text,
however, is considering obligations based merely on the family relationship.
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unclear is difficult at best and useless at worse.
Second, even if obligations based upon family relationship were
sufficiently clear to show that involuntary associations could create
mutual rights and obligations, it certainly would not show that every
involuntary association actually does so.50 The question of whether or not
the mere fact of citizenship or residency in a given country constitutes
the type of involuntary association entailing mutual rights and
obligations cannot be satisfactorily resolved by a claim, however well
founded, that it is not impossible for involuntary association to do so.
Third, even assuming that the analogy with the family is sufficiently
convincing to permit the conclusion that national association does entail
mutual rights and obligations, such an analogy could not successfully
ground the associative obligation argument. It must be convincingly
demonstrated that national association not only entails mutual rights and
obligations, but it must also be shown that these rights and obligations
include Rawlsian distributive justice. To the best of my knowledge, no
supporter of domestic Rawlsianism has offered such a proof.
Furthermore, it would appear that such a demonstration would be highly
unlikely. The specific entitlements and responsibilities vis-à-vis relatives
outside of the nuclear family may not be entirely clear; however, what
may be stated with a fair degree of certainty is that they are not normally
considered to include Rawlsian distributive justice. Such being the case,
it appears impossible to derive obligations of national distributive justice
from the mutual rights and obligations of the non-nuclear family.
4. National association argument: Concluding thoughts
While perhaps striking a certain intuitive chord, the national
association argument cannot be accepted on a priori grounds, but
requires a demonstration of what exactly there is about national
association that grounds claims of justice. In my opinion, claims
advanced to support this thesis fail the test of serious analysis. In fact,
even proponents of the argument often admit the weakness of the claims
they themselves advance.51
Why, then, does the national association argument continue to be
raised? It may be that its true source is the intuitively based assumption
that rules of distributive justice do not apply to foreigners or,
alternatively, that obligations and rights of distributive justice are
somehow less binding, or are secondary to, rights and obligations
50. The fact that membership in certain associations bestows some benefit cannot support a
claim to Rawlsian redistribution. See supra Part II.A.
51. See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 9, at 117–21.
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towards compatriots. National association seems to many to be both a
necessary and a sufficient condition for the operation of distributive
justice. Nevertheless, when the conclusion is subject to rigorous analysis,
it is found wanting. Despite the fact that every explanation proposed to
justify it fails to do so, the argument spawns an ipso facto life of its own
and becomes self-sustaining. National association is offered forth as its
own proof of validity.52 It does not require a great deal of training in the
art of rhetoric to spot the weakness of this attempt to ground the
argument.
C. Original Position Argument
One attempt to justify domestic Rawlsianism posits that individuals
in Rawls’s “original position” would opt for institutions designed to
distribute a society’s resources in accordance with Rawlsian principles
but would refrain from cross-border redistribution.53 Rational, selfserving individuals who knew that they would be members of a
prosperous society would want to mitigate or eliminate the risk that they
would be among the least well-off in that society and would therefore
presumably adopt an internal Rawlsian redistribution of wealth.
Knowing that they were to be members of a well-to-do society, rational
self-interest would indicate that they would refrain from sharing their
wealth with less fortunate foreigners.
The problem with this argument is that the only method by which to
achieve a consensus for domestic Rawlsianism would be to limit
participation in the mechanism of the original position to individuals who
knew that they would be members of a prosperous society.54 Completely
risk-averse individuals who knew that they had only one life to live and
who knew that there existed the possibility that they would be among the
world’s poorest would not agree to a scheme whereby rich countries
would be entitled to redistribute wealth internally and to ignore the
condition of those located outside their borders. Nor would they agree to
a scheme whereby individuals residing in a given country would have
any sort of prior claim to the wealth which happened to be located in or

52. Id. at 121 (rejecting arguments based on sympathy and associative obligations,
nevertheless concluding that “[t]he ‘others’ whose welfare we ought to consider are those . . . who
are relevant to our associative identity,” and “the community-like nature of the nation-state is
particularly well suited, and perhaps even necessary, to the notion of the liberal welfare state”).
53. Id. at 113.
54. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 26, 30–32, 82–83; see also RAWLS, supra
note 1, at 377–78 (principles of justice apply to societies as units and are agreed upon by members of
those societies in the original position).
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produced by that country.55
Limiting participation to members of a given society begs the
question of the justification for such a limitation. Since national
affiliation is undeserved and therefore arbitrary from a moral point of
view, it is unclear why only the views of those known to be nationals of a
given country should be taken into account in deciding issues of justice.
One could similarly convene an assembly of individuals who knew that
they were going to be members of a particular ethnic group or of a
certain social class. The principles of distributive justice which would
emerge from such conventions would differ radically from the principles
which would emerge were the participants put in a “pure” original
position, in which they would be given no information about their
condition. In fact, by carefully screening participation in the convention
and by monitoring the information given to the participants, one could
probably compel the adoption of just about any theory of distributive
justice one chose.
Thus the original position argument does not appear to have any
basis in Rawlsian philosophy. Lifting the veil of ignorance by allowing
certain individuals, who know which society they are to be members of,
to determine how resources are to be allocated is inconsistent with the
principles underlying the use of the original position to establish
principles of justice.56
D. Functionality and Pragmatic Arguments
1. Domestic redistribution as furthering international redistribution
Another attempt to justify domestic Rawlsianism is the argument that
cosmopolitanism is best achieved by each country implementing a
Rawlsian redistribution within its own borders. Were each country to do
so individually, it is argued, the result would be a global Rawlsian
redistribution. Furthermore, the argument states that adoption of a regime
of domestic redistribution is not inconsistent with cosmopolitanism;
rather, domestic redistribution supports and furthers the aim of
cosmopolitanism. 57
However, a global difference principle would require that resources

55. See POGGE, supra note 23, at 242.
56. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that the veil of ignorance “ensures that no one is
advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the
contingency of social circumstances”).
57. CANOVAN, supra note 9, at 34; MILLER, supra note 40, at 51–53 (referring to ethical
obligations in general and not specifically to Rawlsian redistribution).
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be distributed first to foreigners when they are worse off than the worstoff compatriots. Recall that for Rawls, the preferred distribution is that in
which the distributive shares of the worst-off are maximized, even where
overall or average utility is sacrificed.58 Therefore, even if logistic
difficulties mean that fewer foreigners than locals would be helped or
that more of the resources would be used for the expenses of the
distribution process itself, the difference principle would nevertheless
require that the wealth be redistributed internationally so as to maximize
the welfare of the worst off.
2. Ineffectiveness of international redistribution
A related claim, which simply takes the functionality argument to an
extreme, is that the mechanism for international redistribution is
nonexistent.59 Given the institutions presently available, a state, try as it
might, is simply incapable of doing anything to ease the plight of poor
individuals outside its borders. Resources which it attempts to devote to
international redistribution are, in essence, merely being thrown away.60
The difference principle holds that when the welfare level of the
worst-off is the same under alternative distributions, the favored
distribution will be the one in which the welfare of the next worse off is
maximized and so forth.61 It would seem to follow that if the state’s
redistribution policy can have no effect on the welfare of certain
individuals, then the welfare of the least well-off who can be affected
should be maximized.
By the terms of the functionality argument, the welfare of those
outside the state’s borders is unaffected by any action the state may take.
Even if those located in foreign countries include the world’s worst-off
individuals, their fate should be effectively ignored when determining the
ideal distribution. Thus, when foreigners cannot be affected by a state’s
redistribution policies, implementation of a scheme of domestic
Rawlsianism would in fact be the most the state could do to further a
global Rawlsian redistribution.
However, this argument proceeds from a faulty factual premise. It is
true that the institutions of the developed world are ordinarily vastly
more efficient than corresponding institutions in underdeveloped
58. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 76–78.
59. See AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY 171–72 (1980); Samuel Freeman, Introduction:
John Rawls – An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 1, 50–51 (Samuel Freeman
ed., 2003).
60. For example, donor countries have few means at their disposal to ensure that the funds
they contribute actually reach the most needy in the poorer countries.
61. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 83.
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countries or than international institutions, assuming they exist at all. It
is, therefore, true that domestic redistribution is ordinarily easier than
international redistribution and that the costs of the distributive process
itself are considerably less. Nonetheless, it is not accurate to claim that
international redistribution is realistically impossible. Developed
countries, as evidenced by their actions, do not apparently believe so
either. Most, after all, do give some amount of foreign aid. One may
assume that they would not do so unless they were convinced of its
potential effectiveness.62
Furthermore, to the extent that the argument is true and that attempts
at international redistribution are doomed to failure for lack of an
institutional structure to support them, the conclusion should not be that
justice is satisfied by domestic Rawlsianism. Instead, the conclusion
should be that the international institutions as presently construed are
unjust, hardly an earth-shattering revelation.63
Finally, consider the case of individuals living in developed
countries, where the means of distribution are relatively efficient. Why
should the wealthy of one country be obliged to share their wealth with
disadvantaged members of their own society to a greater extent than they
are obliged toward disadvantaged members of the other country?64 The
argument that there are no effective means of redistributing wealth is
certainly not applicable, especially considering that the well-off of each
country are expected, under a Rawlsian model, to share their wealth with
their own society’s disadvantaged.

62. The argument presented is not that countries necessarily give foreign aid out of a sense of
moral duty as opposed, for example, to altruism. The point is that, whatever their motives, their
actions indicate an acknowledgement on their part that transfer payments to underdeveloped
countries can be effective, even considering the inefficiency of the institutions involved.
63. KOK-CHOR TAN, JUSTICE WITHOUT BORDERS: COSMOPOLITANISM, NATIONALISM, AND
PATRIOTISM 26 (2004) (stating that international institutions are often accomplices in the
exploitation of weaker states).
64. It is interesting to note the following comment by John Arthur and William H. Shaw:
[D]isparity of wealth itself cannot be the source of . . . injustice. (Only in a cosmic or
poetic sense is it unjust for me to thrive on my Iowa farm while you barely eke out an
existence in the Yukon.) If we are to speak of justice at all, there must be some relation
between the parties by virtue of which a right is violated or an unfairness done.
John Arthur & William H. Shaw, On the Problem of Economic Justice, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC
DISTRIBUTION 5 (John Arthur & William H. Shaw eds., 2d ed. 1991). Note that the authors refer to
the lack of obligation of a resident of Iowa toward a resident of the Yukon and not, for example,
toward a resident of Alaska.
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3. Lack of support for international redistribution
Another claim raised under the banner of pragmatic arguments is that
the voters in the wealthy countries would never accept anything close to
cosmopolitanism and that seekers of international justice should
therefore moderate their demands in order to have any hope of success.65
This claim, however, is perhaps the least valid of all. If wealthy countries
are not morally entitled to their holdings, then the question of whether or
not the voters in those countries are willing to share the wealth they
possess is immaterial. If analogies are appropriate here, consider the
unwillingness of the aristocracy to waive their feudal privileges; the
long-standing refusal of the South African government, representing the
majority of white voters, to grant suffrage to the rest of the population; or
the decision by a hypothetical thieves’ guild to reject the concept of
restitution. In each case, the possessors of a social good desire to
continue holding on to it. They may even have the physical or political
power to reject competing claims. Nevertheless, possession, desire, and
power do not justify a claim.
It is true that a reformer might, for practical reasons, choose those
battles which she feels she may be able to win. Perhaps it is better to
work, with some chance of success, for a slightly less unjust world than
to labor futilely for a much more just one. Nevertheless, the degree to
which those in possession of the social good respond to pleas for justice
cannot in itself be a factor in determining whether their holdings are
theirs by right.
E. The Failure of Domestic Rawlsianism
Rawls’s contention that the natural distribution is unfair and that
people do not deserve their talents, their social position, or their good or
bad luck has considerable persuasive force.66 When confronted with
those who are not fortunate enough to possess the talents necessary to
achieve a lifestyle easily attainable by others, it is difficult to deny the
arbitrariness inherent in nature’s selection of whom to favor.67
Rawls’s subsequent claim, regarding a positive moral duty to

65. CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUSTICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 77 (1999) (referring
to such views); KYMLICKA, supra note 37, at 225.
66. Even where talents are diligently developed over a long period of time and might
therefore be considered to have an element of desert attached to them, the industriousness and
patience which enabled their development were themselves not deserved.
67. As noted earlier, even Nozick felt obliged to concede the point. NOZICK, supra note 1, at
225.

292

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

neutralize the effects of nature’s unfairness,68 is more contentious. One
might accept the arbitrariness of the natural distribution without agreeing
that human society has an obligation to do anything about it. The maxim
“life is unfair” is both an admission of the capriciousness of nature and
an admonition to ignore the unfairness. It may be argued that a
psychologically healthy individual will focus on what he has and on
doing the best he can with it, rather than dwelling on the unfairness of
life.
National affiliation would appear to be one of those arbitrary
attributes whose impact upon an individual’s life chances should, from a
Rawlsian viewpoint, be neutralized. However, even those social
philosophers who ostensibly view wealth redistribution as a primary
demand of justice do not, in general, ascribe to the internationalization of
domestic distributive principles. Some simply refuse to consider
international aspects of redistribution, indicating their hesitation to
extend the principles they extol to cover those living outside the borders
of the state; others, including Rawls himself, go to great lengths to justify
either limiting the scope of redistribution to the domestic arena or
adopting different standards of justice for domestic and international
redistribution.
Where a principle leads inexorably towards a result contrary to
ordinary intuition, one is faced with the choice of abandoning the
principle or rejecting the intuition. If, as most social philosophers appear
to believe, the intuitive rejection of an international Rawlsian
redistribution is well founded, the most obvious conclusion is that the
basic tenet of Rawlsianism itself is somehow flawed. Perhaps the idea of
a positive moral obligation to neutralize the effects of nature’s
arbitrariness does not conform to our considered judgments after all.
The rejection of cosmopolitanism, in other words, implies a rejection
of the underlying principle from which it flows: that morally arbitrary
attributes cannot serve as the basis for claims of entitlement. This is the
same principle upon which all of Rawlsian methodology ultimately rests.
Thus, unless one is willing to embrace cosmopolitanism, one must reject
Rawlsianism.

68. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 102.
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III. NEEDS-BASED JUSTICE
Rejecting Rawlsianism does not require retreating into a libertarian
worldview. The fact that human society may not be required to mitigate
the unfairness inherent in nature does not imply that people are relieved
of all responsibility for the plight of fellow members of their species.
This Article proposes that the duty to act arises when one individual is in
need of some good and another is able to satisfy that need at a nonprohibitive cost to himself. Imagine, for instance, a desert traveler who
encounters an individual dying of thirst. Assuming that the traveler is
carrying with her more than enough water to meet her own needs, does
she have a moral obligation to give the other some water and thus to save
his life? The proposed duty to act suggests that she does have a moral
obligation to share her water. Additionally, were she, out of either apathy
or maliciousness, to ignore the other’s needs and do nothing, she would
be acting immorally.
At this point, some may question the source of the traveler’s moral
obligation to come to the other’s assistance. As the other would be no
better off had the traveler never existed, the argument could be made that
the other has no claim to the traveler’s assistance, assuming that the
traveler is in no way responsible for the other’s predicament and is not
preventing anyone else from coming to the rescue. The traveler, it may
be argued, might help if she desires to do so—and such an act might be
commendable—but she is under no moral obligation to act. I would
reject this argument and instead contend that the source of the traveler’s
obligation to assist in this situation is rooted simply in her own
humanity.69 Although she is in no way responsible for the other’s
predicament, failure to act would nevertheless constitute a breach of her
moral duty. Furthermore, it would appear that this position reflects most
people’s common understanding of their moral obligations.
Note that the moral obligation of the traveler is not based on
inequality. It is not grounded on the fact that her possession of a
sufficient supply of water is the result of factors—foresight, luck, and so
forth—that are ultimately arbitrary from a moral point of view and that
she is thus undeservedly better off than the other.70 Were she to
encounter another person who was simply less wealthy, she would be

69. It is admittedly difficult to substantiate this position other than to rely on an intuitive
sense of what is right. I concede that one who sees nothing wrong with allowing the individual
encountered to die of thirst in the circumstances described would probably not find the arguments
presented in this Article compelling.
70. Nor, I might add, is it grounded on any claim of transactional or compensatory injustice.
Again, we assume that the traveler is in no way responsible for the predicament of the other.
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under no obligation to share her undeserved good fortune. Her obligation
to assist is based on the other’s needs and on her ability to satisfy those
needs at a non-prohibitive cost to herself.71
Consider now the situation in which the traveler’s supply of water is
barely enough to meet her own needs, such that giving some of her water
to the person she encountered would involve risking her own life. In such
a situation, she does not have a moral duty to share her water. One is not
obliged to satisfy the needs of another when the cost or the risk to oneself
is too great. Herein lies the distinction between moral duty and heroism.
Heroism involves satisfying the needs of others above and beyond the
call of moral duty. One who saves another at no risk to himself has
merely fulfilled a moral duty, whereas one who risks himself to save
another has acted heroically.
Saving another at no risk to oneself may be commendable, but the
commendation would be the equivalent of commending a person for
driving for years without committing a traffic offence. Although a person
should not, perhaps, be commended simply for fulfilling his legal
obligations, the fact is that most of us do occasionally violate traffic
laws. One who refrains from doing so may, therefore, deserve some
commendation. The commendable character of the heroic act, however,
is qualitatively different. If saving the victim involves the assumption of
sufficient risk, then ignoring the needs of the victim would be a morally
legitimate course of action. The commendation in this situation is not for
failure to violate a moral duty, but for acting when no moral duty existed
in the first place.
Moral duty comes into play when one is confronted with another
person in need and the costs or risks of providing that need are not
prohibitive. Needs, however, must be distinguished from wants. The fact
that another individual wants something that I have the power to provide
at little or not cost to myself imposes upon me no moral duty to supply
that want, unless that want can be classified as a need. Nevertheless, and
notwithstanding the centrality of the distinction between needs and
wants, this Article does not attempt to demarcate a line between them.
Reasonable people can differ with regard to what is a need and what is
merely a want.72 As a bare minimum, though, anything necessary for the
71. Cf. WALZER, supra note 9, at 33 (stating that among strangers, positive assistance is
required if it is needed urgently by one of the parties and the risks and costs of giving it are relatively
low for the other party).
72. See KATE SOPER, ON HUMAN NEEDS: OPEN AND CLOSED THEORIES IN A MARXIST
PERSPECTIVE 6–18 (1981) (arguing that the distinction between needs and wants is a political issue);
WALDRON, supra note 19, at 264; DAVID WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH: ESSAYS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE 2–17 (1987) (discussing different ways of distinguishing between needs and
wants and focusing on the degree of harm envisioned if the need or want is not met).
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sustaining of life could be universally recognized as a need.
Similarly, this Article does not delineate exactly what cost or what
risk might be considered prohibitive. Again, reasonable people might
come to different conclusions. However, at least in the extreme cases, it
should be possible to reach universal consensus. For example, where one
is capable of saving another’s life at a cost that would not seriously affect
the welfare level of the actor, failing to act is an abrogation of moral
duty.
The next step is to apply this conception of moral obligation to the
traditional realm of distributive justice. Any definition of material needs,
as opposed to wants, would have to include those goods and services
necessary for physical survival. Reasonable persons may, of course,
argue that material needs include more than mere sustenance, that an
individual requires the means not just to live but also to make life
worthwhile.73 Nevertheless, this Article focuses on sustenance because
basic sustenance would certainly be included in any reasonable basket of
material needs. It would be hard to argue that a person only wants, but
does not need, enough food to avoid starvation; that he only wants, but
does not need, access to a potable water supply; or that he only wants,
but does not need, some protection from the elements.74 Such being the
case, it would follow that people, individually and collectively, who
know that others are lacking basic sustenance and who are capable of
satisfying that need have the moral obligation to do so, provided that the
cost of providing such needs is not prohibitive.
Because needs-based justice limits claims of justice to the
satisfaction of needs, it is more restrictive than inequality-based justice.
The mere fact that individual A undeservedly has more of X than does
individual B is not sufficient grounds under needs-based justice to
impose a duty, even a prima facie duty, to redistribute. Needs-based
justice, while recognizing the arbitrariness of the natural distribution,
does not oblige humanity to right the wrongs of Mother Nature.75 Thus,
the “merely rich” would have no claim of distributive justice against the
“super rich,” even though their difference in wealth is presumably
undeserved. An inequality-based argument for redistribution, on the
other hand, would hold that because one has more than the other, despite

73. Even among those accepting such a premise, the question of what it takes to make life
worth living—or, more specifically, what are the material resources which would enable a person to
make his life worth living—is obviously debatable.
74. Rawls, who seems to adopt a needs-based approach to international justice, similarly does
not define basic needs. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLE, supra note 9, at 119.
75. Or, more accurately, to mitigate nature’s unfairness, as nature cannot be judged in terms
of right and wrong. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 102.
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the lack of desert, a claim for redistribution would ostensibly arise.76
A. Choice and Responsibility
With regard to the role of choice and responsibility in determining
the demands of justice, the obligations of needs-based justice are broader
than those of inequality-based justice. For inequality-based claims to
redistribution, a time slice comparison is patently inappropriate. The fact
that, at a given moment in time, one individual is wealthier than another
cannot serve as the basis of a claim for mitigating the inequality.
Assume, for example, that at time t0, two individuals are similarly
situated by whatever criteria are considered appropriate. At time t1,
individual A consumes part of his material holdings while individual B
chooses to delay consumption until time t3. A time slice comparison of
the two individuals at time t2 would show that that individual B is better
off than is individual A.77 Nevertheless, it does not appear that this timeslice difference in well-being could justify an inequality-based claim to
redistribution. While it is true that at time t2, B is better off than A, it is
also true, and more significantly so, that the two of them are, in fact,
similarly situated over the time interval t0–t3. Forcibly transferring
resources from B to A at time t2 would actually be creating inequality, not
mitigating it.78
Another way of analyzing the situation just described is to note that
at time t0, A and B were both faced with similar choice sets. Each was
able to choose consumption at time t1 or to delay consumption until time
t3. Because both individuals were equally wealthy at time t0, neither
could complain that he was treated unfairly, even if his wealth was less
than that of the other at a later point in time.79
Comparing various individuals’ distributive shares in terms of
76. This is not to say that other approaches to distributive justice would completely ignore
the difference between needs and wants. Presumably, for example, a utilitarian would place primary
emphasis on needs over wants, simply because the pleasure associated with the satisfaction of a need
is quantitatively greater than the pleasure derivable from the satisfaction of a mere want. For needsbased justice, on the other hand, the distinction is not merely quantitative but qualitative; only needs
are the basis of positive moral duties. While one is certainly permitted to consider other individuals’
wants and to act so as to satisfy them, doing so would be considered, not the fulfillment of one’s
moral duty, but the performance of an heroic act.
77. For the purpose of this analysis, I will ignore such factors as individual A’s pleasant
memories of his past consumption or his regret at having indulged his desire for immediate
gratification and the psychological effects of individual B’s anticipation or impatience.
78. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
283, 285–93 (1981). I will assume that the choice to consume immediately was reasonable under the
circumstances.
79. JULIAN LE GRAND, EQUITY AND CHOICE: AN ESSAY IN ECONOMICS AND APPLIED
PHILOSOPHY 87 (1991).
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similar choice sets is not necessarily equivalent to comparing their wellbeing over time. Consider, for example, the case of three similarly
situated individuals who are faced with the opportunity to gamble.
Individual A refrains from gambling, individual B gambles and wins,
individual C gambles and loses. Whether one compares their situations
on a time-slice perspective immediately after the payout or whether one
compares their situations over a time interval which begins before the
gamble and continues until A and B have both consumed their additional
resources, the situations of the three individuals concerned are not equal.
Having gambled successfully, B is by any reasonable measure better off
materially than either A or C. Having refrained from gambling, A is,
again by any reasonable measure, better off materially than C. If
inequality itself were grounds for redistribution, C would appear to have
a claim against both A and B, while A would have a claim against B.
Nevertheless, this inequality cannot be traced to any arbitrariness in
the natural distribution. Each individual concerned was faced with
equivalent choice sets. Neither A nor C can legitimately claim that that it
is unfair that he has less resources at his disposal than does B, nor can C
legitimately claim that it is unfair that he has less than does A.80 Because
C chose to gamble and A chose to refrain from gambling, any claim of
unfairness voiced by either of them would appear to be disingenuous. In
fact, from a choice-set perspective, the three are similarly situated. An
approach to justice which views redistribution as a means of mitigating
the arbitrary inequality inherent in the natural distribution—in other
words, a choice-set, inequality-based approach to justice—would,
therefore, see no need to redistribute resources from A or B to C or from
B to A.
Although choice sets and equality over time are central to inequalitybased justice, they are irrelevant from the perspective of a needs-based
approach to justice. An individual’s needs and her ability to meet those
needs are relevant for needs-based justice. It does not matter how the
individual concerned came to be needy.
Recall, for instance, the situation discussed above in which
individual A consumed his resources at time t1, while individual B,
similarly situated to A at time t0, delayed consumption until time t3. Even
though B is better off than A at time t2, they are equal over time or over
choice-sets, such that B would have no obligation towards A under an
inequality-based system of justice. Nonetheless, if at time t2 A is needy
and B is in a position to help, a needs-based justice would impose upon B
80. Here, too, I am assuming that the decision to gamble was not unreasonable and that a
reasonable person could have chosen to gamble the same as he could have chosen to refrain from
gambling.
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a moral obligation to come to A’s assistance. B may not shirk his moral
responsibility by pointing to the fact that A consumed excessively at time
t1 while B saved for the future.
Admittedly, this aspect of needs-based justice may be
counterintuitive. A, after all, has no one but himself to blame for his
predicament. He could have saved for the future, but he chose not to. By
calling upon B to come to his assistance at time t2, A is in effect asking B
to subsidize his prior consumption at time t1, when B was frugally
ferreting away his wealth for the proverbial rainy day.
Responding to this argument requires consideration of the role of
desert in a needs-based approach as opposed to its role in an inequalitybased approach. Desert appears to play little or no role in either. Under a
merit-based system, desert plays a central role: people get exactly what
they deserve. Inequality-based and needs-based approaches, in contrast,
consider obligations of distributive justice without reference to desert.
Nevertheless, the position of desert in a needs-based approach is
different, if only subtly, from its position in an inequality-based
approach.
Ostensibly, desert is irrelevant for inequality-based systems of
justice, which reject the concept that wealth and poverty are deserved
and therefore seek to mitigate unequal distribution of resources.
Nonetheless, desert occupies, in some ways, as important a position in
inequality-based approaches as it does in merit-based approaches to
justice. Inequality-based approaches go to great lengths to prove that
distributional inequality is unrelated to any type of moral desert. They
rest on the premise that because talents and social position are arbitrary
from a moral point of view, distributive shares ascribable thereto are
undeserved. They conclude that, with no claim of desert to material
holdings, no one may legitimately object to their redistribution.
Ironically, this line of reasoning begins with a discussion of desert.
Even though the discussion sets out to prove that notions of desert are
inapplicable to distributive justice, striving so hard to do so merely
emphasizes their significance. Were desert really immaterial, the
question of whether or not talents and social positions were deserved
would be irrelevant. By basing their arguments on the claim that no
single person deserves his wealth, inequality-based theories appear to
accept the meritocratic position that where claims of desert are
substantiated, distributive share should follow. Egalitarianism is thus
merely a special case of meritocracy, where desert claims are equal.
In needs-based justice, desert is a non-factor. Under needs-based
justice, an individual who, although not needy, is worse off than another
has no claim to share in that other person’s wealth. Again, the reason is
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not that his level of well-being is deserved; questions of desert are simply
irrelevant. However, when a person is in need, others who are able to
come to his aid at a non-prohibitive cost to themselves, yet ignore the
need out of apathy or antipathy, are not fulfilling their moral duty. Here,
too, the entitlement of the needy individual to assistance is not dependent
upon the undeserved nature of his need; as before, desert is irrelevant.
Assume, therefore, that the person encountered by the desert traveler
is there without water due to his own gross negligence. May the traveler,
where the risk involved in saving the other is not prohibitive, choose
inaction on the premise that the other has no one to blame but himself for
the predicament in which he finds himself? Needs-based justice suggests
that ignoring the victim’s needs and letting him die would be immoral.
When considering whether or not the desert traveler is morally obliged to
save another person who is in desperate need of water, the responsibility
of the victim for his predicament is not relevant.81 Needs-based justice
would therefore require the rendering of assistance, regardless of how it
came to be that the individual concerned found herself in a state of
neediness. If an individual is in need and cannot satisfy those needs, any
other individual able to help is morally obligated to do so.
B. Limitations on Needs-Based Justice Claims
As previously noted, one exception to the moral imperative of
assisting the needy is that an individual is not required to assist when the
risks or costs involved are prohibitive. In addition to this exception, there
are two other conditions for entitlement to assistance worth noting.
The first condition of qualifying for assistance under a needs-based
justice scheme is that the person concerned is incapable of meeting those
needs through his own efforts. A person who could work and earn
enough money to supply his needs but chooses not to has no claim on
others, including those who could supply those needs at little or no cost
to themselves. This condition might, at first glance, appear to contradict
the earlier assertion that desert is irrelevant for need-based justice: Part
III.A contended that a person’s responsibility for his own predicament

81. For example, the past fiscal behavior of elderly individuals who are no longer capable of
taking care of their own needs—where “taking care of their own needs” refers not to their physical
state but to their economic state—would be irrelevant.
The irrelevance of desert for needs-based justice and the obligation to assist those in need
whatever responsibility they bear for their own predicament is perhaps an argument for limiting the
scope of needs and classifying anything much above sustenance level as a want. On the other hand,
the fact that desert is irrelevant might be an argument in favor of expanding the definition of needs,
as those who, through no fault of their own, are able to supply their own needs and nothing more are
not entitled, under a needs-based approach, to redistribution.

300

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

does not bar his redistributive claim, and this section contends that no
one has the right to rely on others when he could rely upon himself.
Nevertheless, the two situations are quite distinct.
A needy person is one who is incapable of supplying his own needs.
Thus, by definition, one who is so capable is not needy. On the other
hand, the fact that a person could have supplied his own needs had he
acted differently in the past does not disqualify him from being needy,
provided that at the present time he is no longer capable of supplying his
own needs. Individuals have some measure of control over the present
and the future; we cannot change the past. Our inability to affect the past
manifests itself, for purposes of this discussion, in two ways. First, the
needs to which needs-based justice refers are limited to present or future
needs. A person’s past state of well-being might be relevant for
inequality-based approaches to justice, but it is irrelevant for needs-based
justice. Needs-based justice can only operate in the present, incapable as
we are of supplying past needs. Past needs cannot ground a claim for
needs-based redistribution.
Secondly, an individual’s past capability to provide for his future
does not mean that that person is not needy in the present. Past conduct
can ground an argument of culpability for present needs, but culpability
is not relevant for needs-based justice and can be ignored. Assume, for
example, that a person is earning a salary sufficient to supply his needs.
At this point in time, he obviously cannot claim to be needy. If he quits
his job, cutting off his only source of income, would he now be
considered needy? The answer depends on the circumstances. Assuming
that he could either get his old job back or find a new job, he does not
meet the criteria of neediness. True, he has needs; but as long as he is
capable of supplying those needs, he is not needy. Others who know of
his predicament are under no obligation, individually or collectively, to
come to his aid. If, however, he is incapable of supporting himself, he
would meet the criteria. It might be observed that his lack of a job is his
own fault, as he voluntarily gave up the job he had. In fact, assume that
he had no justification for quitting his previous job and, furthermore, that
he did so with full knowledge that he would not be able to get another
one. In other words, for the sake of argument, assume that he is fully
culpable for his present predicament. Nevertheless, at this stage, there is
nothing he can do about it ex hypothesi. Thus, even if he is fully culpable
for being in a position where he can no longer meet his own needs, he
would nevertheless be entitled to assistance.
The second condition is that even one who is in need and is
incapable of supplying that need himself has no needs-based claim unless
his needs are capable of being supplied. Although this condition may
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appear too obvious to mention, it will prove necessary for our future
discussion.
C. “Lazy or Crazy”
The theory of justice hitherto described is strongly rooted in widelyheld intuitive conceptions of moral duty. To demonstrate, let us consider
the reactions people typically have to the problem of homelessness and,
specifically, what they consider their own obligations toward the
homeless to be.
People who are not homeless often feel uncomfortable with the idea
of homelessness. The discomfort may be rooted in a conflict between
what people believe to be right and what they perceive to be in their own
self-interest.
On the one hand, people instinctively feel that, individually or
collectively, they should do something about the problem of
homelessness. The feeling that one should help the homeless is rooted in
the idea of needs-based justice. Homeless people have needs which are
not being met, and many people intuitively feel that although they are not
personally responsible for the plight of the homeless, they have a
responsibility, if they can, to come to the aid of the homeless. This
feeling of responsibility is not based on the urge to mitigate economic
inequality; rather, it is based on their sense of morality
On the other hand, helping out the homeless often operates against
what people perceive as their own economic self-interest. They may,
therefore, intentionally avoid those areas where they are likely to
confront homeless people. Additionally, they often rationalize their
inaction, and these rationalizations may help expose their underlying
belief structure. The possibility that the homeless person is simply
someone who is down on his luck is the greatest psychological challenge
to those attempting to rationalize inaction and is consequently rejected
out of hand. Homeless people, it is often claimed, are “either lazy or
crazy.” Thus, the rationalization for not coming to the aid of the
homeless is that people who are lazy are not really needy; they can help
themselves, so there is no need for others to come forth and help them.
People who are crazy are beyond help; there is nothing we can do to help
them because whatever we give them will be squandered anyway.
This “lazy or crazy” rationalization reveals some important points
regarding the underlying belief structure. Firstly, someone who is in need
deserves help. Were this not the case, no rationalization would be
necessary. Secondly, the only good reasons for not coming to the aid of
one in need are either (a) he is not truly needy, as he is capable of
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supplying his own needs, or (b) he is beyond help, such that attempting
to supply needs is a waste of effort.
The “lazy” part of the rationalization does not indicate that desert
intuitively plays an important role in issues of justice. The emphasis is on
the fact that the individual concerned is, at present, capable of doing
something about his situation and that he therefore has no right to ask
others to supply his needs. As previously noted, the difference between
denying aid because the person is capable of supplying his own needs
and denying aid because the person is responsible for his own
predicament has demonstrable consequences when referring to past
actions.
Assume that an individual is incapable of working to supply his own
needs because he was seriously injured in a skiing accident. Assume
further that the individual was uninsured and undertook the risk in full
knowledge of the potential consequences. The person concerned is both
needy and responsible for his state. An inequality-based or choice-based
approach to justice might deny him any relief on the grounds that he is
not entitled to compensation from those who refrained from skiing or
who purchased insurance to protect them in case of an accident—in other
words, those who refused to gamble—or from those who, although
uninsured, enjoyed the skiing and escaped the injury—those who
gambled and won. Nevertheless, the rationalizations for refusing to aid
the needy do not normally include such sentiments as “he gambled and
lost.” People are ordinarily willing to allow the consequences of gambles
to affect well-being, but not to the point of denying people their needs.
People’s attitude toward the homeless, including the justifications
they adopt for refusing to render assistance, provide convincing evidence
that needs-based justice is strongly rooted in our intuitive sense of what
is right. We instinctively feel that neediness, whatever its cause, must be
addressed.
D. Economic Effects
Until now, this Article has ignored the possible economic side effects
of granting assistance to the needy. When considering the simplified
cases of individual A, who is in need, and individual B, who is capable of
satisfying that need, economic effects are irrelevant. The concept of
neediness, as previously noted, excludes those who are capable
themselves of satisfying their needs. Thus, describing A as needy is
operating under the assumption that A is incapable of satisfying his own
needs, whether or not B comes to his assistance. B could not therefore
justify his refraining from rendering the requisite aid on the grounds that
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lending aid would discourage A from helping himself. Thus, the only
possible scenarios are (1) B helping to meet A’s needs and (2) A’s needs
being unmet.
Institutionalizing such a scheme, however, might encourage
individuals to take greater chances than they ordinarily would and to rely
on the safety net of needs-based justice to limit their risk. Of course, this
is not to say that all or even most individuals would dramatically change
their behavior in response to the institutionalizing of the principles of
needs-based justice. People whose welfare level is considerably above
the level of neediness will most likely act to protect themselves from
falling to that level. They have a strong incentive to allocate the
necessary funds for medical insurance, retirement, and so forth in order
to avoid neediness. Their knowledge of the existence of the safety net
might not play a serious role when the level to which they will be
allowed to fall before being entitled to assistance is considerably below
the level to which they have been accustomed.
On the other hand, for individuals who are barely above the level of
neediness, the limitation on risk might significantly affect their decisionmaking process. When calculating the possible outcomes and the chances
of the various outcomes occurring, the fact that their needs will always
be met may encourage some individuals to undertake a particular course
of action that would not otherwise be worth the risk. This is particularly
true with regard to insurance and savings. Where the option of relying on
the safety net is real, the incentive to insure or to save is correspondingly
reduced.
The extent to which the institutionalizing of needs-based justice
would actually affect behavior is an empirical question beyond the scope
of the present discussion; the normative issue, however, can be
discussed. Assuming that the institutionalization of needs-based justice
would, in fact, cause an increase in the number of individuals who would
not be able to take care of their own needs, the normative question is
how this fact might affect the obligations inherent in needs-based justice.
These obligations, as previously discussed, can only be limited if (a) the
individual concerned is capable of providing for his needs and is
therefore not truly needy, (b) the needs of the individual concerned are
incapable of being met, or (c) the risk or cost involved are prohibitively
high.82 The mere fact that providing for the needy is likely to lead to an
82. Could there not be other concerns, outside these three limitations, which would justify a
refusal to assist? While it is ordinarily difficult to prove an assertion that there are no other
legitimate concerns, it nevertheless appears to me that these are the only limitations which needsbased justice could support. If someone is needy (limitation (a)) and his needs are capable of being
met (limitation (b)) at a non-prohibitive cost (limitation (c)), it is contended that assistance must be
rendered.
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increase in the number of individuals who are incapable of satisfying
their own needs would not, therefore, be relevant unless such increase
could trigger one or more of the specified conditions.
If the increase in the number of needy individuals is moderate, such
that others could continue, albeit at a greater cost to themselves, to
supply those needs, the obligation to assist is irresistible. In other words,
human society cannot say to needy individual A, “I refuse to come to
your assistance, even though you are needy and we are capable of
supplying those needs, because if we were to do so, individual B might
soon become needy too and would also require assistance,” provided that
society is, in fact, capable of supplying the needs both of A and of B. The
fact that a third party may decide to modify his behavior in a way
inimical to the interests of one who is called upon to fulfill his moral
duty cannot justify a breach of that duty.83
However, the situation may be qualitatively different when the
economic effects are more severe. Consider a scenario in which the
institutionalization of needs-based justice would encourage a great
number of individuals to gamble away their ability to satisfy their own
future needs. Assume further that the projected number of individuals
who would become needy as the result of such a disincentive is so great
that the total assistance required would be prohibitively costly and that at
least some of the needy will not have their needs met. Society would then
confront the dilemma of satisfying present needs at the cost of meeting
future needs. Society simply would not be able to provide for all needs,
whether present or future. In such a case, society could decide that not
supplying present needs is the lesser of two evils.
Even in such circumstances, though, the extent to which assistance is
withheld from the needy must be kept to a minimum. Every denial of
assistance to an ostensibly entitled individual must contribute to
prevention of more neediness in the future. Thus, it might be legitimate
in such cases to discriminate between those who bear responsibility for
their present state of neediness—in other words, those whose present
state of neediness is the result of their own past actions—and those who
could not have reasonably prevented it. The reason is not that those who

83. Recall the case of the desert traveler. Assume that giving water to those who need it
would encourage others to wander in the desert without sufficient water supplies. As long as the
traveler has enough water to supply her own needs, refusing to come to the aid of those in need
would still be immoral.
However, as the text goes on to argue, where the amount of water carried by the traveler
and by others like her is likely to prove insufficient to meet the needs of all those they encounter
wandering in the desert without water and where the only way to prevent people from putting
themselves is such a predicament is to refuse water to those who need it, the refusal might be
considered a moral course of action.
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bear responsibility for their neediness are any less needy or that they
deserve their neediness. The reason that assistance may be denied is
strictly utilitarian: the disincentive effects of providing assistance can
only impact those for whom positioning themselves to be able to satisfy
their own needs in the future is a realistic possibility. Thus, if it is known
that only those not responsible for their predicament will be entitled to
assistance, individuals capable of securing the means to satisfy their own
needs will not be encouraged to neglect their future needs.
Distinguishing between the two may, of course, prove impossible in
practice.
It should be emphasized, however, that denying assistance to the
needy must be considered a last resort. If, for example, society’s
resources are threatened with being stretched beyond capacity, it would
be preferable to continue to provide for the needs of all the present needy
and to announce that all those whose future actions or omissions—or,
better yet, specified acts or omissions—render them needy will not
receive assistance or will be entitled to a reduced level of assistance. If
such a declaration of intent is credible, it may be able to avoid the
disincentive effects and still allow the satisfaction of present needs.84
Alternatively, it might be reasonable to institute a mandatory social
security scheme, which would insure individuals against neediness due to
injury or retirement.
An additional economic effect that must be taken into account is the
impact of the redistributive scheme on the behavior of those who would
be called upon to render the assistance. Supplying the needs of those
incapable of doing so themselves would presumably be financed through
taxation. Higher taxes, however, serve as a disincentive to productive
economic activity, and reduced economic activity means fewer resources
available for assisting the needy. In other words, the heavier the tax
burden, the more quickly the cost of providing for the needy is likely to
prove prohibitive.
Thus, in determining whether the costs of providing assistance are
prohibitively high, the question of how the granting of assistance will
affect people’s future behavior cannot be ignored. If institutionalizing a
scheme of assistance would, in time, overwhelm society’s capacity to
assist the needy, limiting the circumstances in which aid is rendered
would be justified. The imperative of providing for present needs must

84. Of course, there will still be individuals who will continue to risk their ability to care for
their own needs where the potential reward is, in their mind, sufficiently great, or where the chance
of losing the gamble seems sufficiently small. Under the hypothetical of stretched resources, the
denial of assistance to those individuals will be necessary to maintain the credibility of the
institutional mechanism.
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be balanced against the threat of not being able to meet future needs.
E. Justice and Altruism
An important point to consider is whether the implementation of
needs-based justice would exhaust human capacity to create a better
world. Ostensibly, the answer to this query would be negative. Consider
a world in which the principles of needs-based justice were fully
realized. The distribution of wealth might still be very unequal. Assume,
therefore, that a relatively wealthy individual decides to distribute some
of his wealth to those less fortunate than he. Needs-based justice does not
require him to do so, as ex hypothesi, all satisfiable needs have already
been met. Nevertheless, he recognizes that he is no more deserving of
wealth than others and wants to share what he has. Alternatively, he may
feel that although he does deserve his wealth, others, due to the presumed
decreasing marginal utility of material goods,85 might derive greater
benefit from his holdings than he could.
Most people would probably feel that the action described would be
admirable. Most people would probably feel that a world in which
wealthy people were more generous and more willing to share their
wealth with others less well-off would be a better place to live. In fact,
most people would probably feel that a world in which wealth were more
equally distributed would be better than one in which it were distributed
less evenly. In fact, it is difficult, with the framework of modern
philosophy, to argue that unequal distribution of wealth is a goal that
society should pursue.86 Such being the case, it would seem that even
after the principles of needs-based justice had been fully implemented,
there might still be room for improvement as far as distribution of
economic resources are concerned. Why, therefore, should we consider
the demands of distributive justice to be satisfied when needs are
satisfied? Why not include within the demands of justice whatever would
make the world a better place in which to live?
The reason to prefer a less extensive definition of justice is that there
is a fundamental difference between aspiring to a better world and using
the coercive power of government to achieve that end. Working toward a
world in which people are more generous, kind, compassionate, and
caring is an eminently worthwhile goal. Most people would prefer a
world in which such virtues were prevalent. But legislating generosity
85. It is normally presumed that the more material goods one has, the less satisfaction one
derives from a given increment.
86. Cf. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 3–4 (1938) (explaining the tax
structure in pre-Revolutionary France).
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and kindness is an exercise in futility. Coercion can only help in
regulating the most blatant violations of those virtues. Assault, trespass,
theft, and libel can be legally proscribed, unfriendliness cannot.
Therefore, the fact that a certain act is widely considered desirable or
admirable does not mean that requiring the performance of that act
against the will of the individual concerned is necessarily a step in the
right direction.87
The inability to coerce what is generally perceived as positive
behavior is not confined to needs-based justice. It is endemic to most, if
not all, conceptions of distributive justice. To demonstrate the limits of
coercion, consider Rawls’s difference principle, the most extensive
rational redistribution scheme possible.88 As inequality is permitted only
to the extent that it serves the interests of the worst-off; any further
equalization of wealth beyond that which is dictated by the difference
principle would be detrimental to those very interests that the
redistribution was meant to promote.
Nevertheless, the difference principle could still result in vast
discrepancies in wealth. For example, where the imposition of high rates
of tax on highly skilled individuals would result in them curtailing their
activities to the detriment of society as a whole—and to the detriment of
the worst-off members of society in particular—Rawls would condone
allowing them to retain a greater than average share of wealth.
Furthermore, in the likely case that it would prove impossible to
determine the marginal net compensation which would induce the
optimal exploitation of each particular individual’s talents, the difference
principle would presumably allow whole classes of individuals to retain
disproportionately large distributive shares, as long as increasing the tax
rate on that class of persons would impact negatively on society’s worstoff members. Despite the resulting, potentially vast, inequality of wealth,
no state-imposed scheme of redistribution could be more protective of
the interests of the least well-off.
Assume now that members of a well-off class decide to donate some
of their relatively extensive wealth to those not as well-off. Most people,
including Rawls, would probably view such an altruistic act positively.
Besides being generous and fostering a sense of community, it would
create a distribution of resources superior, from a Rawlsian perspective,
87. Cf. Alexander McCall Smith, The Duty to Rescue and the Common Law, in THE DUTY TO
RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 55, 55 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds.,
1993) (“[T]here are many moral precepts which are not legally enforceable.” (quoting Malone v.
Metro. Police Comm’r, (1979) 2 W.L.R. 700 (Ch.)).
88. Rawls’s difference principle, it should be noted, is not synonymous with domestic
Rawlsianism. As discussed in supra Part II, limiting a redistribution to the inhabitants of a single
country cannot be justified in terms of the difference principle.
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even to that which could be brought about by the implementation of the
difference principle itself. Society, of course, cannot require such
behavior. Due to the overall economic effects, it would be
counterproductive to do so.89 Society can do no more than simply stand
on the sidelines and applaud when individuals, from their own inner
convictions, perform acts of altruism voluntarily.
Thus, the difference principle, as extensive as it is, is not the last
word in redistribution. No distributive principle can be. Any distributive
principle must leave room for voluntary acts of redistribution beyond the
limits of what justice can rationally impose.
IV. GOING BEYOND THE REQUIREMENTS OF JUSTICE
Requirements of justice know no geographic boundaries. If justice
requires the alleviation of need, then alleviation of need is required
wherever it may be found. Except where the existence of an international
border poses an impediment to assistance, its existence is irrelevant for
purposes of justice.
The question which now arises is whether, in regulating its internal
affairs, a country may go beyond the requirements of justice. It may not,
of course, adopt a regime which falls short of satisfying the requirements
of justice, which are as applicable within a country’s borders as they are
without. Those who are needy are entitled to assistance from all who are
able to supply it. The question is whether, having satisfied both its
internal and external obligations, a country may adopt a tax regime
whose purpose is to redistribute wealth domestically beyond what justice
demands.
An individual, having satisfied the obligations imposed upon him by
justice and being free to do with his holdings as he pleases, who decides
to go beyond the demands of justice by transferring part of his holdings
to others less well-off would be considered heroic and his act
commendable. It might, therefore, appear that a nation that exceeds the
demands of justice by instituting an internal redistribution scheme should
be commended for doing so. However, when an individual goes beyond
the demands of justice, he is choosing to waive his own use of resources
for the purpose of benefiting others, even though he is not obliged to do
so. Thus, were every individual in the country to participate voluntarily
in the redistribution, there would be no question as to the legitimacy of
the scheme. Yet redistribution is rarely a voluntary scheme.
Redistribution ordinarily involves the forcible transfer of wealth from

89. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 151.
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some individuals to others. Thus, it is necessary to determine from what
source a country derives the right to take from some of its citizens in
order to give to others.
A. National Cohesion
An argument can be raised that redistribution contributes to national
cohesion and fosters a sense of interdependence: compatriots, whether
they like it or not, share a common political destiny.90 The fates of all
individuals and of all groups in a society are ultimately intertwined.
Furthermore, the nation is an essential vehicle for the creation and
transmission of culture, and national affiliation is central to most
individuals’ self-definition.
It might be claimed that excessive inequality weakens the bonds
which hold a society together. Redistribution of wealth reinforces
feelings of solidarity and allows the state to serve as a vehicle for
promoting the economic, cultural, and social interests of its members.
Furthermore, when a country finds itself in conflict with other countries,
national cohesion can be crucial to achieving national goals.
Nevertheless, the question remains as to why redistribution is
legitimate. However lofty the goals of internal redistribution and
whatever its contribution to generating feelings of national fraternity,
why demand that the cost of establishing such interdependence fall on
some when the advantages are to all? Even assuming that redistribution
would positively impact national cohesion and further national goals,
simply pointing out the overall benefits of a certain course of action
cannot justify the imposition of a tax to transfer the wealth of some to
others. If the benefits of national cohesion accrue to the nation as a
whole, then it would seem that the cost should similarly be borne by all.
B. Relative and Absolute Need
When defining their needs, people are affected by their knowledge of
what others have. What is considered a need in one part of the world
might be classified as a want, a luxury, or even an extravagant
overindulgence in another part of the world. Thus, it might be argued that
a “need” is not an absolute but rather a relative concept. Accordingly,
international justice might be thought of as requiring the satisfaction of
only basic needs, and countries whose local definition of need is higher
would be tasked with instituting internal redistribution.

90. TAMIR, supra note 9, at 117.
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The relative need argument, attractive as it is, appeals to conceptions
of inequality-based justice and not needs-based justice. The fact that
others having more might make one dissatisfied with what one has is an
argument for redistribution based upon inequality or, perhaps more
precisely, perceptions of inequality. It does not, however, substantiate a
contention that one who is faced with a higher standard of comparison is
more needy than one who is not. In needs-based justice, alleviation of
envy is not considered a need. Under a needs-based approach to justice,
the “merely rich” do not have a claim of redistribution against the “super
rich.” The fact that the standard of comparison established by the super
rich may cause feelings of inadequacy, envy, and dissatisfaction among
the merely rich is irrelevant.
People’s tendency to compare their own standard of living with that
of others around them is, in any case, a problematic justification for
redistribution that would be required, not by the inequality per se, but by
awareness of the inequality. Ignorance could, therefore, substitute for
redistribution, and hiding the standard of living enjoyed by the wealthy
would apparently satisfy claims of justice. Consider also what would
happen if the lifestyles of the wealthy, despite their attempts to avoid
exposure, were revealed to the less well-off public. Who would be
responsible for the ensuing dissatisfaction: the wealthy, whose standard
of living is the focus of the dissatisfaction, or those who brought it to the
attention of the public at large?91
What others have, or the perception of what others have, cannot
serve as basis for claims under needs-based justice.
C. Benefit Theory
Benefit theory—the idea that the tax an individual pays should
reflect the benefit he derives from public services—has served as an
attempted justification for a redistributive tax structure.92 It is claimed
that because one of the primary functions of government is the protection
of wealth, the wealthy should bear the greatest share of the costs of
providing those services.
91. I am assuming that the wealth referred to was acquired legitimately, so that, aside from
establishing a basis for comparison, it is unobjectionable. By way of comparison, one who divulges
that the wealth of an individual or of a class of individuals was acquired in violation of the norms of
transactional or compensatory justice does not contribute in any way to the injustice; ignorance of
injustice cannot serve as a remedy. A world in which victims of transactional or compensatory
injustice are ignorant of the violation of their rights is not more just than a world in which they are
aware of the facts. The situation described in the text is different. The claim being considered is that
knowledge of the lifestyles of others is what creates the injustice.
92. EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 190–202
(2d ed. 1908).
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Tax theory, however, has long recognized that relying on benefit
theory to justify a progressive tax structure is problematic. It would
require proof, not only that the rich receive greater benefit from
government services, but also that the benefit increases at a greater rate
than does their wealth. It is far from obvious that this is actually the case.
John Stuart Mill, for example, contended that benefit theory would result
in a regressive tax structure, with the weakest elements of society being
the most dependent upon government protection.93
A related problem concerns financing assistance to the poor. Henry
Simons, for example, argued that using benefit theory to allocate the cost
of redistribution is a contradiction in terms.94 Financing transfer
payments by charging the recipients would, of course, undermine the
purpose of the exercise. Similarly, if the government were to establish
soup kitchens to feed the poor and then charge each person who entered
an amount equal to the benefit received, it would no longer be providing
welfare services but simply operating a commercial diner.
In effect, benefit theory is founded on the principle that anyone who
benefits from government services without paying for them is unjustly
enriched at the expense of his fellow taxpayers. Its goal is to prevent any
disturbance of the pre-existing distribution. Benefit theory is, therefore,
the antithesis of redistribution.
Another benefit theory argument for redistribution is based on the
contention that the true motive for redistribution is not concern for the
welfare of the poor but, rather, a desire to protect the privileges of the
wealthy.95 To enjoy their holdings, the wealthy require social stability,
which could be threatened when vast disparities in wealth create widescale dissatisfaction with the socio-economic structure. The rich thus
have an interest in redistributing wealth to the extent necessary to keep
discontent below the threshold of civil unrest.96
While the argument presented is not, perhaps, unfounded, it is

93. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CHAPTERS ON SOCIALISM
156–57 (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 92, at
156–202 (indicating that benefit theory has been used to justify progressive, proportional and
regressive taxation).
94. SIMONS, supra note 86, at 4.
95. FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 20–21, 38 (2d ed. 1993) (1971).
96. But see JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 73 (E.P Dutton & Co. 1951) (1861) (“[In accordance with some conceptions of
benefit theory,] all should pay an equal capitation tax for the protection of their persons (these being
of equal value to all), and an unequal tax for the protection of their property, which is unequal.”).
Note also that very wealthy individuals often have the means to protect themselves and thus benefit
less from redistribution than do members of the middle class, who are often the first victims of a
breakdown of the social order.

312

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 21

nevertheless problematic. As already noted, benefit theory is
fundamentally anti-redistribution. Only after all legitimate claims have
been satisfied could benefit theory be called upon to prevent a disruption
of what would now be a just distribution. Thus, in order to consider
benefit theory, it must be assumed that all just claims to redistribution
have already been satisfied. Given this assumption, the threat to disrupt
the present distribution is inherently unjust. It is a threat to take by force
the legitimate holdings of another.
Paying another person not to use illegitimate force to threaten one’s
holdings is the moral equivalent of succumbing to a protection racket.
While yielding to the threat may be the most prudent course of action, a
more principled response—and one which could prove more costefficient in the long run—might be to defend oneself by allocating more
resources to the protection of life, liberty, and property.97 Ostensibly it is
those whose lives, liberty, and property are at risk who should bear the
costs of the protection. Those who pose the threat gain no benefit from
measures undertaken to defend against it.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that only those who desire protection
should pay for it is questionable, as it would seem to follow that
criminals, deriving no benefit from law enforcement, would be relieved
of the burden of paying for it through special tax breaks, a result which is
patently absurd.98 In fact, compensatory justice would seem to demand
the opposite result. Whereas criminals are the ones who create the
necessity for law enforcement on the rest of society, they, more than
anyone else, should pay for it. Similarly, if one group in society is
illegitimately threatening the well-being of another, it would seem that
the cost of defending against that threat should be borne by the former.
Thus, applying this reasoning to the welfare benefits, the cost of
maintaining the social order would apparently need to be paid for by the
less well-off, who are ostensibly threatening the legitimate wealth of the
rich.

97. WALDRON, supra note 19, at 265.
98. The question of whether the profits of criminal activity should be subject to taxation was,
in the past, a subject of controversy. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946), overruled in
part by James, 366 U.S. 213. To the best of my knowledge, however, no one has ever raised the
claim that criminals should be exempt from taxation because they derive no benefit from law
enforcement.
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While traditional attempts to ground redistribution on the benefits
supposedly received by the wealthy from the existence of the state or
from its protection of their fortunes are unconvincing, benefit theory
should not be disparaged of in this context. It is possible to construct a
benefit theory type of argument to justify a relatively extensive domestic
redistribution.
D. Benefit Theory and Sentiment
As discussed earlier, more concern is ordinarily shown for the fate of
compatriots than for the fate of foreigners. The reason for this
unbalanced concern might be found in humanity’s tribal origins and its
primitive survival mechanisms. Whatever the cause, people do tend to
care more about their compatriots than they do about foreigners and are
ordinarily more willing to lend a hand when the well-being of their
compatriots is concerned.
Let us therefore assume that raising the welfare level of the less welloff members of a given society—even if the needs of the worst-off have
already been met—is something members of that society would tend to
view favorably.99 Assume, in other words, that people would prefer to
live in a society in which economic resources are distributed more fairly.
In such a case, raising the welfare level of the less well-off and
mitigating economic inequality would constitute a psychological benefit
to the members of that society. By the terms of benefit theory, imposing
a tax to finance the provision of that benefit is, therefore, wholly
justified.
Of course, one may question why it would be necessary to impose a
tax in order to finance the redistribution if all members of the society
concerned were interested in mitigating inequality beyond the strict
requirements of justice. Why could the society not achieve the desired
state of affairs through voluntary transfer payments? After all, when
sentiment moves one to give gifts to family members or to friends, one
simply does so; the impulse driving such sentiments does not need to be
enforced by government action.
However, relying on voluntary contributions to finance action, the
benefits of which cannot reasonably be limited to contributors, raises
issues of both efficiency and fairness. This Article has assumed that all
members of the society concerned are interested in the mitigation of
economic inequality beyond the dictates of distributive justice.
Nevertheless, one would have no economic incentive to contribute,

99. In Part IV.E infra, I will consider what happens when this assumption is relaxed.
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unless he were convinced that the redistribution would be fundamentally
curtailed without his contribution. The psychological advantage of living
in a more equal society accrues to all, whether or not they contribute to
the redistribution.100 In a society as large as a modern country, where the
impact of any single individual’s contribution is negligible, no one would
have an economic incentive to contribute. Although the project might be
economically efficient—in other words, the cost to each individual could
be set at less that the psychological benefit that would accrue to him—
the inability to exclude free riders from enjoying the advantages of the
redistribution would prevent what could have been a Pareto
improvement.101 Even if it were possible to finance the project through
voluntary contributions, it seems unfair to allow some to rely on the
civic-mindedness of others and, despite not contributing to the cause, to
enjoy the same benefits as those who did contribute. While a variety of
reasonable formulae for imposing financial burdens may be proposed, it
would appear that distribution of the burden in accordance with a
person’s level of social consciousness is not among them.
Redistribution beyond the supplying of needs can therefore be
justified not in terms of distributive justice but, rather, in terms of
transactional justice. The dictates of global distributive justice are
satisfied when essential needs are met. In acting to promote the goal of
redistribution beyond what is required by the dictates of justice, the
government is providing a service that the market is incapable of doing
efficiently. Imposing a tax to finance the redistribution is merely
charging taxpayers for the psychological benefits accruing to them.
Admittedly, no taxpayer contracted with the government to receive
the service in exchange for a fee. Strictly speaking, then, there is no
transaction and no place for transactional justice in the classic sense of
the term. However, benefit theory steps in to fill in the gap. Where the
market is incapable of operating efficiently, benefit theory holds that the
government may provide the service and then charge each taxpayer
according to the benefit he or she derived from that service. 102
Until now, this Article has assumed that all members of the society

100. Although we have assumed that everyone supports the goal of a more economically equal
society, we may also assume, human nature being what it is, that most people would prefer that
somebody else pay for it.
101. A Pareto improvement is a change which leaves at least one individual better off and
leaves no one worse off: VILEFREDO PARETO, MANUEL D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 617–18 (1909),
translated in T.W. HUTCHISON, A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DOCTRINES, 1870–1929, at 225 (1953).
102. Cf. NOZICK, supra note 1, at 93–95 (Even if a person benefits from a service, he is not
obliged to contribute toward its maintenance unless he agreed to do so. “One cannot, whatever one’s
purposes, just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or seize) payment. Nor can a group
of persons do this.”).
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in question are interested in redistribution beyond the dictates of
distributive justice. Assume now that some individuals are indifferent to
the issue of economic inequality and that mitigating inequality or
improving the lot of the worst-off does not accord any psychological
benefit to some members of the relevant society. These individuals could
argue that because they derive no benefit from such activity, and because
we are not dealing with alleviating needs, the government has no right,
under the terms of either transactional or distributive justice, to require
them to help pay for it.
The real issue is one of quantifying the benefits each individual
receives, and allowing that some members of society derive zero
satisfaction is merely a limiting case. According to benefit theory, one
who derives great pleasure from the service should pay a lot, one who
benefits less should pay correspondingly less, and one who derives no
benefit should not be called upon to contribute at all. However,
quantifying benefits will often prove impossible in practice.103 For
example, how much does any particular individual benefit from public
parks?104 How much does any particular individual benefit from a parade
down Main Street? How much does any particular individual benefit
from knowing that the society of which he is a member is concerned with
the welfare of the disadvantaged? There seems to be no realistic
alternative to estimating, based on objective criteria, the extent to which
individuals will benefit or have benefited from government-supplied
services.
Implementing benefit theory, whether with regard to national
defense, environmental protection, or welfare assistance, necessarily
involves a great deal of estimation, much of which is probably
inaccurate. Nevertheless, unless one is willing to abandon benefit theory
altogether, acting on conjecture is unavoidable. Therefore, where it
seems reasonable to assume that most of those members of society who
would be net givers under a proposed scheme of welfare assistance
would derive psychological benefit from its implementation, benefit
theory can be relied upon to justify the imposition of tax to

103. It may be difficult or impossible even to estimate the overall benefit to society. In many
cases, therefore, we simply estimate the benefit, compare it to the cost, and proceed accordingly. The
democratic political process may be viewed, in part, as an admittedly very crude way of estimating
the benefits of proposed actions relative to their costs. The greater the number of people who favor a
certain course of action, the more likely it may be that the benefits to be derived from that course of
action exceed the cost.
104. I am not including here situations in which it is possible to fund the activity through user
fees, such as by charging admission to public parks. I am referring to situations where it is
unrealistic to charge for admittance or where even those who do not actually enter the park
nevertheless benefit from its existence.
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finance that assistance. 105
E. The Limits and Consequences of Benefit Theory Redistribution
What happens when there is little or no interest in an economically
more equal society? In other words, what happens when the cost of
providing assistance beyond the level of need is greater than the total
psychological benefit which comes from living in a society which takes
better care of its worst-off members than is morally required? In the
situation described, redistribution would be unjustified. Distributive
justice has already been satisfied. Transactional justice would not permit
the redistribution, since the price the government proposes charging the
taxpayer for the service is presumed to be greater than the expected
benefit.
Redistribution is, of course, not an all or nothing affair. Willingness
to fund up to but not beyond a certain level can be traced to the familiar
convergence of two economic trends: diminishing marginal return and
increasing marginal cost. From the perspective of the net donors, the
psychological benefit of redistribution may be subject to the law of
diminishing marginal utility because doubling the assistance given to the
poor may not produce twice the amount of satisfaction for the net donors.
Furthermore, taxes extracted to fund the redistribution are likely to
impose an increasingly heavy burden on the taxpayer. At some point, the
cost of funding the redistribution will equal and then outweigh the
psychological benefit it brings. Until that point, benefit theory can
provide the basis for a system of tax and transfer. Beyond that point,
taxing for the purpose of redistribution is no longer legitimate.
The extent of redistribution, determined by the caprice of society’s
“haves,” may appear at first glance strange or even demeaning. Why
should the distributive shares of society’s disadvantaged depend upon the
generosity felt by their more affluent compatriots? Could it be that the
obligations of redistribution will vary from society to society merely due
105. To forestall an objection that taking from those who genuinely oppose the policy would
nevertheless be tantamount to theft, it might be helpful to phrase the argument in procedural terms.
Consider the civil justice system. The possibility that the plaintiff will unjustly succeed is an
accepted facet of the system. In ordinary cases, for example, all that is required to succeed is a
preponderance of evidence. Nevertheless, lacking the omniscience necessary to determine who is
entitled to what, we have no option but to rely on the available evidence, incomplete as it may be.
Furthermore, the presentation of evidence may be barred when the cost or potential harm of doing so
is significant enough.
Similarly, the principle that only those who support a policy should have to pay for it
may be considered a substantive rule whose implementation is subject to procedural criteria. Where
a good faith effort is made to determine people’s actual predilections, any inaccuracy may be
regarded simply as a regrettable consequence of our lack of omniscience.
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to the personal preferences of the wealthier among them? Would it not be
more intellectually compelling to propose a rule delineating the extent of
redistribution that members of a society would be morally obliged to
follow, whatever the personal preferences of the wealthier among them?
To be sure, there cannot exist an objective set of criteria for internal
redistribution. For argument’s sake, assume that it were possible to
formulate a rule for internal distribution that every society was bound to
follow. The rule would specify the extent to which economic inequality
would be subject to mitigation. It might adopt a strict Rawlsian approach
that mandated, for example, that inequality should be mitigated to the
extent that any further equalization would adversely affect the well-being
of the least well-off. It might simply delineate the rate of taxation which
should be imposed for the purpose of funding transfer payments and/or
the provision of services to the less well-off. In any event, the same
degree of inequality mitigation would almost certainly result in a greater
absolute benefit to the less well-off in wealthier countries than in poorer
countries. In other words, the primary beneficiaries of any “share the
wealth” program would likely be those poor individuals who happen to
live in rich countries. Similarly situated individuals living in poor
countries would benefit less, simply because there would be less wealth
to share.
Nationality is, as discussed previously, an undeserved and morally
arbitrary attribute which cannot substantiate a claim to distributive
shares. Any such claim must be nationality-neutral. And yet, any rule
providing for an internal sharing of the wealth would necessarily
differentiate on the basis of nationality and apportion claims accordingly.
Similarly situated individuals could fare very differently in different
countries; one might be a net receiver of transfer payments while the
other was a net donor, simply because one occupied a lower than average
economic position in his country, while the other, with identical absolute
wealth, occupied an above-average position in hers. As our previous
discussions have shown, no rule of justice could dictate the allocation of
distributive shares merely on the basis of nationality.106 Therefore,
internal redistribution must be based not on any rule of justice, but upon
feelings of national fraternity prevalent in that society. The level of
justifiable redistribution would be dictated by the degree of fraternity.
106. This is not, of course, meant to imply that nationality could never be a factor in
determining distributive shares. For instance, were geographical or political obstacles to prevent the
rendering of assistance to residents of a particular country, refraining from rendering such assistance
might not be unjust. Nevertheless, the nationality of the individuals who would otherwise be entitled
to assistance is not the controlling factor. While it may be true that the objective obstacles may only
apply to individuals of a particular nationality, justice condones the withholding of assistance, not
because of the nationality, but because of those objective obstacles.
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Predilections can, of course, change. People may sometimes be more
willing to share their wealth than they are at other times, as evidenced in
democratic countries by election results that indicate varying levels of
sympathy for redistributive efforts. The degree of internal redistribution
that a country institutes will likely fluctuate over time, reflecting public
attitudes to the extent to which a society’s policymaking process
incorporates those attitudes. Under the rules of distributive justice, such
shifts cannot be considered normative. They can only be viewed as
moving society closer to or farther away from some ideal distributive
model.107 When society recognizes its moral obligations and acts
accordingly, the institutions will approach the ideal.108 When distributive
obligations are ignored due to ignorance, greed, or other factors, the gap
between what institutions do and what they are supposed to do will
widen.
In accordance with needs-based justice, both national and
international institutions are required to operate so as to satisfy needs
where doing so is not prohibitively risky or expensive. A society acts
illegitimately if it does not establish the institutions necessary to satisfy
its obligations towards either its own needy members or towards
foreigners, regardless of whether the failure to do so is a result of
ignorance of its obligations or because of an unwillingness, for whatever
reason, to fulfill them. Whatever its procedures for determining how it
acts, it has no more right to decide to refrain from fulfilling those
obligations than it has the right to decide to take by force wealth which
legitimately belongs to others.
However, once obligations of distributive justice have been satisfied
and further redistribution proceeds under the jurisdiction of benefit
theory, there is nothing anomalous about the adaptation of institutions to
the prevailing political opinions. In fact, ignoring the change in attitude
and continuing on with a program which was formerly appropriate might
no longer be legitimate. What is normatively required is not a particular
set of institutions or even a particular degree of redistribution, but rather
the adaptation of institutions to people’s attitudes toward redistribution.
An important distinction between redistribution based upon
principles of distributive justice and redistribution based upon principles
107. I am not referring here to adaptations of a given model to changing circumstances.
Having adopted a particular distributive model, a country may find that changes in overall wealth or
in wealth distribution require, for example, a modification of tax rates to obtain the same results
which the previous tax rates had formerly been able to achieve. What I am concerned with, in other
words, is the phenomenon of shifting goals which a society sets for itself, not the adaptation of the
means by which it achieves those goals.
108. One of the functions of the social philosopher, on this view, is to show people what their
moral obligations are in the field of distributive justice.
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of benefit theory may be the extent to which the granting of benefits to
the less well-off may be conditional. Where justice requires a
redistribution, the ability of those in possession of the wealth to impose
conditions on its redistribution is restricted; they can no more impose
restrictions on the redistribution of wealth in their possession than can
the possessor of lost or stolen property place conditions on the property’s
return to its rightful owner. Redistribution undertaken based upon the
terms of benefit theory is different, in that the extent of justifying
redistribution is a function of society’s willingness to assist its least welloff persons. It may, therefore, impose conditions on the granting of that
assistance.
However, conditions may be imposed in practice, even when
assistance is granted within the context of needs-based justice. Provided
that the condition is reasonable, one who refuses to satisfy the condition
would no longer meet the criteria of neediness. Assume, for example,
that aid to the needy is conditional upon their entering a job training
program or undergoing treatment for whatever condition is responsible
for creating or perpetuating their state of neediness. Provided that the
condition to receiving assistance is reasonable, its imposition would not
violate the distributive obligations of those who are in a position to help.
As previously mentioned, anyone who is presently capable of supplying
his own needs should not be classified as needy. As long as the
opportunity remained available and the conditions remained reasonable,
there would be no duty to assist those who, due to an unwillingness to
meet the conditions, declined the proffered assistance.
F. Benefit Theory, Distributive Justice, and the Terms of Public Debate
Would debates over public policy be affected by viewing the
question of redistribution as one to be discussed under the terms of
benefit theory as opposed to under the terms of distributive justice? One
might argue that the effect would be minimal. As a practical matter, each
participant in the public policy debate attempts to convince her audience
that the views she espouses are preferable to the alternatives. The
political process then judges the effectiveness of the arguments raised on
all sides and adopts an appropriate position. The procedure appears to be
similar whether the arguments are based upon criteria of distributive
justice or benefit theory. Nevertheless, there would be significant
differences between the two.
Where the debate is held under the terms of distributive justice, each
participant argues that his position is the correct one and is mandated by
considerations of justice. The attitude of his audience is inconsequential
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for the purpose of determining the moral value of his arguments. If his
arguments are correct, then justice requires their adoption. A proponent
of the difference principle, for example, would presumably argue that the
only just course of action for society to take is to establish institutions
which implement that principle. The fact that the vast majority of society
might reject the Rawlsian model would in no way affect the fact that it is
morally required. The job of the would-be molder of public opinion is
simply to convince his audience of society’s moral obligation. The
audience, in fact, is only important for procedural reasons. It is only
because they hold the key to implementing the proposed model that they
need to be convinced.
Furthermore, members of the target audience need not be convinced
that they are happy with the proposed redistribution scheme. It is enough
that they feel it to be their obligation. For example, there is nothing
anomalous about a person responding to a justice-based argument by
saying, “I do not like the idea of sharing so much of my hard-earned
wealth with others, and I wish that I did not have to do so, but it appears
to be my moral duty.”
When, on the other hand, the debate over public policy is held within
the framework of benefit theory, the target audience plays a substantive,
rather than merely a procedural role in shaping social institutions, as
public opinion determines not just what will most likely happen, but
what ought to happen. The justification, under benefit theory, for
instituting a more extensive redistribution than is required by the dictates
of distributive justice is that by providing transfer payments to the less
well-off, the government provides a service to those who prefer living in
a more economically equal society. The government is therefore justified
in redistributing wealth to the extent and only to the extent necessary to
satisfy that preference.
When the mood of the public changes, the degree of redistribution
that is justifiable will also change. For example, when members of the
public are less interested in redistribution than they were previously, the
government would not be entitled to continue charging them for a service
which they were no longer interested in receiving. Redistribution would
need to be scaled back, although the minimum level of redistribution
necessary to satisfy the demands of distributive justice would, of course,
have to be maintained in any case. When, on the other hand, public
support for redistribution increases, a course of action which may not
have been legitimate in the past might become justified.
Thus, convincing the target audience of the need for a more
extensive redistribution, for example, is not a means to a just result under
the benefit theory. Without the public’s support, a more extensive
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redistribution is not just politically impossible, it is actually unjust.
Convincing others to share one’s personal preferences could therefore
affect not just what the government will do, but what it ought to do.109
V. CONCLUSION
The international arena must be considered when testing proposed
principles of distributive justice. If applying those principles in the
international context conflicts with one’s considered judgments
regarding moral duty, the conflict might indicate a need to rethink the
principles. Furthermore, an examination of considered judgments
regarding moral duty in the international context might show them to be
relevant for the domestic arena as well.
Many social philosophers signal their discomfort with the
international implications of the principles they espouse simply by
ignoring the international arena. Recently, however, scholars have begun
to examine the international implications of principles that have been
developed domestically. While some are willing to apply those principles
globally, most who consider the issue are hesitant to do so and have
109. In order to highlight the differences between public policy debates in the framework of
distributive justice as opposed to those held in the framework of benefit theory, consider the
implications of circumventing public opinion and attempting to influence decision-making by a
direct appeal to those with actual decision-making power. Where issues of distributive justice are
concerned, such an appeal would, ostensibly, be justified. The fact that the decision does not
conform to what the public wants is irrelevant, as the decision conforms to what the public is
morally required to do. Where, on the other hand, the issue is one of benefit theory, convincing the
public is necessary in order to justify the implementation of one’s own predilections.
The approach suggested here may be helpful, for example, in formulating the principles
concerning the appropriate role of the judiciary in matters of fiscal policy. The courts, on this view,
may be a legitimate venue for addressing issues of distributive justice. Distributive justice, after all,
addresses the fundamental question of what belongs to whom, and what belongs to whom is a
question which courts routinely address.
When a dispute arises as to property rights, the substantive issue before the court is not
usually the question of who presently possesses the property, but rather who is entitled to possession.
An argument that the court’s function must be limited to determining who is in actual physical
possession and that opining on who is entitled to possession is beyond the court’s mandate would, of
course, be summarily rejected. The job of the court is to determine the right of possession, and if the
party with the right to possess the property is not the party in actual possession, to act so as to rectify
the situation. Their ruling on issues of distributive justice would be no more an overstepping of the
bounds of their authority than are their rulings on issues of transactional, compensatory, or punitive
justice.
Beyond the strict requirements of distributive justice, however, a court would have no
authority to determine the proper distribution of wealth in society. Whether or not the society in
question desires to go beyond the requirements of distributive justice and institute a more extensive
redistribution of resources is an issue for the members of that society, acting through the political
process, to determine.
This brief note does not, of course, constitute a complete analysis of the role the courts
should play, and of their relationship vis-à-vis the legislature, in formulating social policy.
Nevertheless, it may be helpful in considering what that role should be.
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therefore sought out justifications to avoid extensive international
redistribution.
Rawls contended that morally arbitrary factors are inappropriate
criteria by which to determine distributive shares.110 Those who are less
favored by nature, he claimed, have an equal moral claim to primary
goods, the only justification for unequal distribution of resources being
economic efficiency.111 Yet, if morally arbitrary factors are indeed
inappropriate criteria by which to determine distributive shares, it would
seem to follow that allowing nationality to determine who is entitled to
what is problematic.
If justice requires a Rawlsian redistribution, it must demand that the
same principles be applied to all, without regard to race, religion, gender,
caste, natural talents, social position, or nationality. If, on the other hand,
nationality is a legitimate factor in determining distributive shares, it is
unclear why other, equally arbitrary characteristics could not be
legitimate factors also. The former premise leads to cosmopolitanism and
the latter leads to libertarianism. Capturing the middle ground between
cosmopolitanism and libertarianism requires adopting a position that
recognizes, on the one hand, that morally arbitrary factors do in fact
determine distributive shares and does not impose upon human society
the obligation to neutralize the effects of those factors, and yet, on the
other hand, does not dismiss redistribution as an essential element of
distributive justice.
Needs-based justice does not impose any duty to mitigate economic
inequality per se.112 It does, however, require the proffering of assistance
to those in need when the cost and risk involved in doing so are not
prohibitive. However, when organizing its internal affairs, a state may, in
certain circumstances, go beyond the strict requirements of distributive
justice. Where members of the society are interested in a more extensive
internal redistribution, the state may provide some of the wants of the
less well-off members and charge the others for the service provided.
The extent of redistribution permissible under such a scheme would be
established not by any philosophically determinable formula, but rather
by the actual predilections of the particular society concerned at any
given moment in time.

110. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 72–75.
111. Id. at 151.
112. Rawls’s own conception of international obligations strongly resembles needs-based
justice. See RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 9, at 117.

